On China's System Of Cooperation Between Local Governments In Regional Economic Development

With the general adoption of the market principle, the region ofChina have more closely relationship with each other, the integration ofregional economy has become an unavoidable tendency. But we canclearly feel the absence of the suitable co-relationship between localgovernments. With the reform of the decentralization of the CentralGovernment and the realization of local governments for their ownprofits, the local governments may cooperate in some fields to gainmaximum interest as well as they compete with each other. Thus, therelationship between local governments shows the tendency ofinstitutional co-opetition. And the core of this relationship is theinstitutional co-opetition. The author focusing on the institutionalco-opetition, using New Institutional Economic research methods,Gametheory, positive analysis together with theoreticall analysis, beginningwith the disagreement between the profit and the object, basing on theknowledge of regional science and public administration, makes someoriginal research theoretically and positively.Under the background of the integration of the regional economy,the institutional co-opetition between the local governments is theexpansion of the co-opetition theory which originated in the law and thebusiness administration.This institutional co-opetition is the cooperationbased on ordered competition and the competition based on cooperation.It's the outcome of the development of the relationship between the localgovernments and also the unavoidable stage of the integration ofregional economy. But the existence of institutional co-opetitionrelationship is of no necessity, it is based o,n the independence for thelocal governments to make their own policy, the disagreements ofeconomic profits between them,and the government validityimprovement. The institutional co-opetion between local governmentsare dynamic game as well as static co-opetion relationship. Because ofthe ambiguity of the outcome of their cooperation, this "restrictedrational" may lead to the different results—the success or lost of theinstitutional co-opetition gamble.The institutional co-opetition relationship is also changeable. Until now, it doesn't show the goodtendency as we had expected mentally and theoretically. It only shows apendulum phenomenon, that is, the relationship sways betweencooperation and competition. Of course, we need the institutionalintegration after cooperation to make institution innovation. To achievethis, we should try our best to avoid the factors which lead tocompetition during the real institutional co-opetition-governmentthrough perfecting such aspects as the concept of the institutionalco-opetition, the rules, cost-control, profit-concord and. admitting thesocial power involved in the institutional co-opetition gamble.