Mbo Pricing Of State-owned Enterprises Studied

As a system Innovation, Management Buy-out(MBO) is playing a positive role in effectively integrating resources, reducing agency cost, rationalizing the property relations and standlized corporation governance.It has become a method that state-owned capital exits the company. A lot of empirical research home and abroad shows that MBO for listed companies is good for them to establish new interior incentive mechanism, optimize ownership structure, and improve management capacity. But for MBO in China, especially in state-owned enterprises, there are lots of problems, such as, unreasonable pricing, opaque acquisition process and so on. which results in too much loss of state-owned assets. Among these problems, the most important one is pricing.This article will stress on the core problem of MBO—the pricing. Part one reviewes the theory of MBO, states the situation of the research on MBO home and abroad, then founds out the insufficiency in research. Part two analyzs the problems of MBO in state-owned enterprises. It cover that pricing base is unreasonable, the managers'historical contribution can't be quantified logically and"collusion"and"rent-seeking"questions derivatived from"virtual proprietor". Moreover, it analyses the reason of these problems. among which the uppermost one is that there is no MBO pricing model to fit Chinese national conditions. Part three constructs MBO pricing model for China with the Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP), based on drawing experience from European and American countries and learning lessons from Russia. Parts four is the application of the model. This article pointes out that constructing appropriate model can not radically solve the MBO pricing problem. unless it is combined with supporting measures. Part five of this article explains these supporting measures. Part five is the conclusion of the paper.This part analyzes the insufficiency, and makes prospect.