Executives Of Listed Companies Pay Design

The competition for talents is the very focus on which firms put. How to set up an effective incentive mechanism to give play to the top management ?the core of a firm, is the key that concerns the survival and development of the firm. For a listed company, this is of special importance.Being one of the earliest listed companies in Xi'an, Shan Jiefang Groups Limited Company is also facing the problem of how to give play to the top management's initiatives and thus achieve success of its Second Taking-off . Based on this objective, and under the guidance of theories, this dissertation designs a compensation system that fits Shan Jiefang, hoping to give some instructions to the development of the company.This dissertation, first, presents the definition of top management. And based on the analysis of the nature of their work and their behavioral features, this dissertation identifies that, to make sure that the top management's behavioral features satisfy the shareholders, it is necessary to perfect all sorts of mechanisms; practice the labor-based incentive contract between the owner and the top management; and motivate them through rational compensations.Due to the complex of the top management's work and thus the complex of their compensation decision, we need systematic theories in designing the compensation mechanism: according to the theories of human resources, in modern productive forces system, talents, which feature intellectual labor, are not only the production factor in a general labor sense, but also the capital factor that has the androgenic function of appreciation; the property rights of advanced human capital are complete property rights, which determines that the top management has the right to decide "what to do " and " how much todo". The incentive mechanism by property rights is a self-incentive mechanism resulting from the competition among the top management-梩he owner of the property rights; this is an "active mechanism". The motive of their behaviors originates from their strong concern for their own property rights, which must be exchanged on the basis of equal value. This is a game process proceeded under a "passive mechanism"梩he principal-agency mechanism.Both in the "active" and the "passive" mechanisms, the compensations of the top management are determined by their contributions. Considering the particularity of human capital of the top management, it is imperative to link their compensations to their performance, and their fixed income to their risky income. Based on this principle and the Shan Jiefang's actual situation, this dissertation works out a concrete compensation policy for it.At last, this dissertation raises some unsettled problems for all of us to study further.Fan Van (MBA) Directed by:He Liancheng...