The State - Owned Enterprise's Human Capital Property Right Motivation | Posted on:2004-03-21 | Degree:Master | Type:Thesis | Country:China | Candidate:J Guo | Full Text:PDF | GTID:2206360122467095 | Subject:Western economics | Abstract/Summary: | PDF Full Text Request | In 1960's, the economics proved that human capital is the most active and particular factor in production. But they paid no attention to the problem of how to incentive human capital. In fact, not only the amount of human capital, but also the effective utilizing of it is the most crucial factor that decides the economic performance. And because the owner of human capital-human being controls the capital completely, it is necessary to incentive not to monitor human capital. The more effective the incentive mechanism, the more fully the utilizing of human capital. And The efficient promotion of human capital depends on an efficient property right arrangement.As a matter of fact, human capital in state-owned enterprises is not motivated well for the non-correspondence of property rights. And this leads to the poor economic performance of the enterprises. To deal with the problem and enhance enterprises's performance, the property right system and property right structure should be reformed and the policy of the shareholding of human capital should be carried out.The thesis relates to the following problems: Firstly, what is the relation between human capital and the efficiency of enterprises? Secondly, why it is necessary to incentive human capital through sharing the property rights of the enterprises? Thirdly, what are the main reasons for the inefficient motivation mechanism in state-owned enterprises and what are the adverse effects of it? After completing all of the above discussion, the thesis will make empirical research into the problem of how to arrange the sharing of the property rights of state-owned enterprises to incentive human capital efficiently. To put it in detail, the owner of human capital of state-owned enterprises should be permitted to participate in sharing the residual claim in order to match with the residual rights of control. So we put forward a relevant measure to resolve this problem. Of course, in order to have satisfactory effect, the above reform measure should be co-operative with other reform measures such as the revise of the law and so on. | Keywords/Search Tags: | state-owned enterprises, human capital, property rights of human capital, incentive, share-holding of human capital | PDF Full Text Request | Related items |
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