Village Field Of Non-balanced Interests Of The Game

"Village-township Government and Villagers Self-government" is a grass-roots political system based on which Chinese mainland governs the countryside. During the period of transformation in the countryside, actual operations of "Village-township Government and Villagers Self-government" are social actions that are collectively taken by governments, cadres and villagers. They are a process of benefit-games in the Village Fields. From the viewpoint of un-equilibrium, this research tries systematically to find out the essence, mechanism, characteristics and resuhs of the benefit-games in the countryside of today's china dominated by the "Village-township Government and Villagers Self-government".The paper contains five major parts. The first part summarizes the establishment and development of "Village-township Government and Villagers Self-government" from the viewpoint of benefit-games. Then given this system as the background, it explains the concepts of the Village Fields, the benefits-games in Village Fields. I think that the Village Fields are "space of games" where all rational players undertake the social struggle for benefits. Benefit-games in the Village Fields are collective rational actions that proceed from the rational governments, cadres to villagers. According to the differences of the benefit targets, the paper distinguishes village-town from the system of governments, and takes village (including the villagers and cadres) as the players. Village-town is the lowest level of state political system.The second part analyzes the benefit-games between village-town and village in the actual operational process of villagers self-governance, and generalizes four deviations through comparing these with institutional arrangement of benefit-games. Namely, "Appointments by government" deviates from "Direct-elections by the villagers", "Decisions by the officials" deviates from "Decisions by the villagers", "Monopolization by the elites" deviates from "Participation of the villagers", and "Village-finance controlled by government"deviates from "Village-finance opened to villagers". These deviations are the main manifestations of the un-equilibrium of benefit-games in the Village Fields.The third part lays emphasis on the un-equilibrium structure in the players' organizational status, authority relationships, acting domains, etc, and analyses the un-equilibrium structure in resource, information, power or force, the possession and operation of techniques for games, the comprehension ability of the games' rules. These factors collaboratively decide the un-equilibrium structure of benefit-games in the Village Fields.The fourth part inquiries into the dysfunction of "Village-township Government and Villagers Self-government", such as the expanding of village-town's administrative function, the weakening of villagers' self-governmental function, the running off of political resources of grass-roots and the facts that some institutional functions are no long in force and benefit claims of rural organizations are out of order, all of which are brought about by the un-equilibrium structure of benefit-games in the Village Fields.Finally, the paper gives some rational considerations on rectifying the dysfunction of "Village-township Government and Villagers Self-government", promoting the healthy development of "Village-township Government and Villagers Self-government" and constructing a co-win equilibrium mechanism for benefit-games in the Village Fields.Major innovations of the paper:1, the paper analyzes the institutional rules and their deviations from the perspective of benefit-games in the Village Fields.2, the paper tries to develop a framework of analysis and inquires into the un-equilibrium structure of benefit-games in the Village Fields.