Font Size: a A A

China's State-owned Enterprises Operating Payment Incentives

Posted on:2006-04-07Degree:MasterType:Thesis
Country:ChinaCandidate:S GouFull Text:PDF
GTID:2206360152485743Subject:Accounting
Abstract/Summary:PDF Full Text Request
This thesis presents some thought about current managerremuneration stimulus system against the background of modernenterprise system reform of state-owned enterprises, and attempts tomake some improvement according to the characteristics of state-ownedenterprises. The first part of this thesis summarizes the characteristics anddrawback of current manager remuneration stimulus mechanismaccording to the status quo of manager remuneration stimulus system ofstate-owned enterprises, which is that overall remuneration level isrelative low, structure is single and remuneration stimulus is ineffective. Succeeding the first part, the second part of this thesis makes analysisof the status quo of manager remuneration stimulus. After makinganalysis of domestic state asset management system withcommission-agent theory, it is found that the relationship betweenenterprise owner and manager is not completely commission and agentrelationship of economic sense as its dependence on administrativesystem. Meanwhile, owner absence and "insider control" makes thiscommission and agent relationship more complicated, which increasesagent cost and makes remuneration mechanism ineffective. At the sametime, the scarcity of outside manager market of state-owned enterprisesand ineffectiveness of capital market reduce the risk of managers, andincrease the difficulty of carrying out stimulus measure. The third part discusses the general theory of remuneration system,including such basic factors as remuneration design principle, externalfactor, basic remuneration structure, and design process, etc. Generallyspeaking, an effective manager remuneration stimulus system mustcombine various kinds of stimulus methods comprehensively to establisha set of scientific and reasonable remuneration system to attract, retainand stimulate managers. When designing such a stimulus plan, we shouldconsider the overall stimulus level and the proportion of various stimulusmethods in remuneration system, this part sets a theoretical frame fordesign of state-owned enterprise remuneration system in succeedingparagraph. The fourth part is a key part in this thesis. It establishes the rationaleof manager remuneration stimulus reconstruction of state-ownedenterprises mainly through the analysis of essential features ofstate-owned enterprises. To start with, the essence and function ofstate-owned enterprises determine that manager remuneration stimulussystem goal has the characteristics of diversification and differentiationdue to different industries and different strategic status. Secondly, itoutlines the basic principle of manager remuneration design ofstate-owned enterprises on this basis, specifying the thread of managerremuneration system reconstruction. The fifth part discusses the reconstruction of manager remunerationstimulus system of state-owned enterprises, specifying the basic structureof remuneration stimulus system and summarizing current managerremuneration approaches. Then it discusses the structure andreconstruction of concrete remuneration system of different types ofstate-owned enterprises respectively. In the concluding part, it makes some explanation and supplementabout related issues of manager remuneration stimulus untapped in thethesis, including manager spiritual stimulus and remuneration stimulusbody and related topics. The main contribution presented by this thesis is as follows: 1. Practicability of topic selection Stimulus and binding of managers is an eternal topic of companygovernance. Presently, state-owned enterprises are in the transitionalperiod, Chinese manager team is also gradually becoming mature.Designing a far-reaching and practicable manger remuneration system torealize effective stimulus and binding is a practical need whether for thecountry (Whose role is the owner) or for managers. Meanwhile, a bigportion of studies on manager stimulus and binding mechanism aretheoretical studies from economics angle, and involve little systematicstudy of remuneration system that is a key approach of stimulus. Fromthis point...
Keywords/Search Tags:state-owned enterprises, manager remuneration stimulus mechanism, the reconstruction of manager remuneration system
PDF Full Text Request
Related items