Game Analysis On The Selection Of Productive Testing Service

With the rapid development of China’s manufacturing industry and industrial structure transformation, the enterprise’s demand of Inspection Service has kept rising. Up till the present moment, there are few studies on the inspection services, and in the study of high productive services and technical services as well is still lack of the study of productive inspection services. Through analyzing the present situation of productive inspection services and researching enterprise inspection services selection decisions and the partner relationship, incentive system, to provide the basis for enterprise decision inspection services. Therefor further study of productive inspection services outsourcing decision and its problem has important theoretical and practical guiding significance.This article first defines the concept of producer inspection services, and analyzes the current situation of inspection services. Then summarize the inspection service selection mode of manufacturing enterprises and development direction, a testing service selection decision-making model is established. Based on the transaction cost theory, from the perspective of inspection services volume and asset specificity, marginal analysis method, determine the scope of the testing service outsourcing, and identify the testing service outsourcing risks in the whole cycle. Secondly, after inspection service outsourcing is determined, using evolutionary game theory, set up an inspection service cooperation evolutionary game model, analyzed the dynamic evolution process of inspection service cooperation, and through the asymmetric evolutionary game analysis, obtained the evolutionary stable strategy of detection institutions and manufacturing enterprise relations of cooperation. Because players in different populations of initial state learning speed and so on lead to different evolutionary path, using Matlab to validate the results. Finally, On the basis of analyzing the relations of cooperation, based on principle-agent theory, establish a supervision and incentive mechanism of rewards and punishment to make sure the actions selected by the inspections are good for manufacturing enterprises from the perspective of self-interest.Through the paper finding equilibrium of the internalization and outsourcing decisions and the influence factors of outsourcing cooperation, created an incentive mechanism, effectively promote cooperation between the two parties, helping company advancing quality and efficiency, promoting manufacturing industry upgrading transformation, promoting the healthy development of the productive service industry.