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Rural Public Resource Management Game Analysis Under The "Two Committees" Pattern

Posted on:2012-01-30Degree:MasterType:Thesis
Country:ChinaCandidate:W H LiuFull Text:PDF
GTID:2216330338473658Subject:Agricultural Economics and Management
Abstract/Summary:PDF Full Text Request
With economic development and commercialization of resources development, the depth and breadth of resources development are increasing, so each kind of resources property price boost. In many rural, with the rise of rural public resources value, it has caused many contradictions and disputes about the public resources' use, transfer and the Asset-like earnings distribution in public resource management process,even affected rural social harmony and stability. In the present rural public resource management, the relevant government departments control public resource management by administrative means; township government official provide guidance and services for public resources management; in Rural community, village cadres as agent manage public affairs, but in practice, the public source government on the whole is unpleasant. The important reason of public resources management disorder is opportunism behavior of stakeholders.The rural public resources collective property Characterized by common property and nature of resource object determines village cadre who is village agent to become the granted governing subject. As a result of the survival difficult position and the institutional flaw's correlation, the base government' self-interesting item has substituted for the public item to a certain extent, and village secretaries who is supported by base government always in a powerful position. Moreover, the people behavior ability weak, Supervising mechanism not to be perfect causes the village agent' opportunistic behavior in the village public source government. When village director and village secretary some from village elite club, many game makes conspiring to act as a normal state. When the village director coming from non-elite club participates in the management, the type of village director has affected village secretary' game payment expectation, and then village secretary will possibly adopts strategy of deceit. The village secretary'deceit strategy makes conspiring to rupture. Because of facing the opportunism behavior of village secretary, village director's opposition strategy become helpless choice, as his opposition strategy will give it to win the prestige benefit at least. But, the basic reason of conspire is not because of design of two committees in Chinese village self governance, but the lack of the restriction mechanism to opportunism behavior. Therefore, the only method to improve countryside public resource management efficiency is to construct and perfect the public resource management mechanism, including self-decision, executive power and supervision.According to this thesis research, we can come to following several conclusions:1st, behavior alienation of rural cadres is external causes of rural public resource management disorder.2nd, rural villagers' self-government growth is not mature, lack of the effective channel participating in public resource management is internal causes of rural public resource management disorder.3rd, the pattern of two committees in Chinese village self governance is not cause of the public source management disorder, just the external form of interest conflict.4th, the key of rural public resource management orderly is to form village-level right balance mechanism, and the key to form village-level right balance mechanism is public resource management mechanism should have the widespread social basis.
Keywords/Search Tags:rural public resources, management, evolutionary games, management mechanism
PDF Full Text Request
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