Asymmetric Triangle Relations: Southeast Asia Between US And China

The observation of the triangle asymmetric relations in my research becamepossible through distinction and correlation of comprehensive, common andcooperative securities.The comprehensive security in this research considers the aim of the states tokeep balance while pursuing military, political, economic and other kinds of securitieswithout subordinating them to each other.Common security means that the individual states have to take into account thenational interests of group of states which help them to achieve bargaining abilities.The cooperative security means that the states are cooperating in order topromote the stability of the region where they are pursuing their comprehensivesecurities. The cooperative security also means the struggle against commonnon-traditional threats such as terrorism, maritime terrorism and piracy.I took into consideration the East Asian financial crisis in1997and the globalfinancial crisis since2008with their impact on regional and global affairs in order tointroduce my case studies which include third and fourth chapters.Chapter1consists of definition of Asymmetry for my triangles. Sometimes themisperception about asymmetric relations is noticeable in a way that the asymmetryshould protect someone’s interests wholly. To be a participator of asymmetricrelations is not enough. The state still have to manage such relations. I insist on theimpossibility of this management without bargaining model. Normative asymmetricrelations based on recognition and deference is the best way to support the stability inthe region but they have to be checked because of novelty or growing and reducingdisparities between actors within triangles and need mechanisms to sustain normativeasymmetric relations. Here is the functionality of bargaining model which will allowthe states to protect their national interests without involvement in war. It means thatif even the conflicts appeared and the tension grows they supposed to be negotiatedthrough bargaining model. It seems to be quiet efficient in asymmetric relations wherethe larger power cannot simply dominate on small power and the small one cannotchallenge the larger power because of difference in capacities.Chapter2includes the relations of Southeast Asian countries with major powers or the triangle asymmetric relations in the period from the end of Cold War to EastAsian financial crisis in1997. In this chapter I emphasize on novelty of relations andthe difficulties which Southeast Asian states had to overcome especially since the endof the Cold War. The emergence of novelty took place by two phases. The first phaserefers to Sino-American rapprochement against Soviet Union. It is about Dittmer’sstrategic triangle which helped to cause preliminary patterns of smaller andasymmetric triangle relations. The second phase begins with the collapse of the SovietUnion when the United States emerged as the sole superpower. Because of novelty inpost-Cold War period the states of Southeast Asia found their position in the trianglemuch more vulnerable than before. The end of the Cold War, the collapse of theSoviet Union and the emergence of the USA as the sole superpower lessen thestrategic importance of common security between the United States and SoutheastAsia. Therefore, the states of Southeast Asia faced the reluctance of the United Statesto tolerate the prospect of benefiting from American largesse. It means that on handSoutheast Asian states found their dependence on U.S market and financial systemquite vulnerable for them. On the other hand they had to manage their relations withemerging China. Such novelty of relations predetermined the foreign policy ofSoutheast Asian States toward these two major powers. In this case it was better forSoutheast Asian States to think about self-balance and because of the triangleasymmetric relations only the choice of one of two major powers for cooperation orthe unification with one of them against the other would violate the term ofcomprehensive security for Southeast Asian states. Indeed, some of Southeast AsianStates were able to create their own asymmetric triangles but in order to minimizetheir dependence on major powers and achieve a strong leverage for bargainingabilities in relations with major powers, they had to share the A>B>C asymmetrictriangle by its participation in collective C angle of Southeast Asian States. In1990sthe weakness of regional coherence and the vulnerability of Southeast Asia due tonovelty of relations caused constraints for individual states of Southeast Asia becausethey had to take into account the interests of Collective C angle in A>B>Casymmetric triangle while trying to manage the relations within their own triangle. Asit is clear the common security caused some constraints for comprehensive security ofindividual Southeast Asian States but at the same time the comprehensive securitywas impossible to pursue without common security. Here the good point for Southeast Asian countries is that the growing potential of Southeast Asian states and the gradualimprovement of regional coherence were likely to lessen such constraints.Chapter3includes the triangle asymmetric relations since East Asian financialcrisis, the period when through successive policy of self-balance and growing regionalcoherence the collective C angle reduced the constraints for individual states ofSoutheast Asia. Due to its growing geopolitical importance Southeast Asia can causestrong competition between major powers within triangle and get huge benefits.Moreover, the advantage of the strongest A is the disparity between A and others. Itmeans that it is sensitive to loss of any kind of influence or the reduction of disparity.But to be sensitive means to be involved easily or even inclined to enter incompetition against other which tries to advance and reduce the existing disparity. Allof these are mentioned because C can invite B to play more responsible role and theresponse of A through re-enforcement of its presence and reengagement is morepossible if not unavoidable. As a result they will compete to be more attractive and Cwill benefit because of some factors. First, the sides will work harder and will offer Bmore attractive plans for cooperation than before without competition. Second, C willnot lack of choices or the ability to bargain. Third, it is a good way to keep A in theregion and check the engagement of B with C. The desire of A to care for a disparitywill entail to its involvements in competition unless the establishment of balance forall sides. It looks like cycle inside asymmetric triangle. The actor achieves disparitythat serves its interests in relations with others but in order to keep the existingdisparity it has to be involved in competition with the actors that claim for newpreferences. By nature the cycle is an ongoing process unless the establishment ofbalance when the cycle will achieve higher status than the competition for disparity. Itmeans that the states of Southeast Asia are not likely to be interested in growinginfluence of one of major powers. On the contrary, the involvement of major powersin the region must be balanced by Southeast Asian states in a way which will servetheir interests in maximum.Since global financial crisis in2008the reduction of disparity between thestrongest A and others is noticeable and I am going to summarize the profound impactof the Global financial crisis on the international order and global affairs due to somefactors. First, in such triangle symmetric relations A has the status of global power.Therefore, I need to describe the outcomes of global financial crisis for global affairs and define the role that the strongest A has to play in world affairs. Second, the sameGlobal power which could aggregate its widespread power in order to affect theregional affairs outside of its region, now it had to deal with growing role of emergingpowers in order to succeed in management of its world affairs.The changes because of Global financial crisis could affect the A>B>C trianglein a way that A began to share with B more important relations. The US unipolarworld strategy seemed to be insufficient to provide the existing international order. Itmeans that the aggregation of power by China to make use of it in regional affairs ismuch more possible. Now the United States has to make more efforts for competitionin Southeast Asia. I am going apply to this logic in order to explain the fact that inspite of the Global financial and economic crisis the United States tended to boost theeconomic and trade relations with the countries of Southeast Asia. Moreover, I amgoing to argue that it is not prudent approach to generalize the outcomes of globalfinancial crisis and its impact on global affairs. Though the global financial crisisaffect the state of Global asymmetry and lessened the gap between the United Statesothers, the involvement of the United States in regional affairs of Southeast Asia willbe deeply and in long-term perspectives due to redistribution of resources andreproduction of power.