The Construction Of Interests Coordination Mechanism On Farmland Protection Of China

Farmland is a scarce resource, it has multiple social value. With the rapid development of industrialization and promotion of urbanization, the contradiction between farmland protection and economic development is becoming increasingly acute. Therefore, it is of great significance to research the farmland protection.This thesis has taken the farmland’s triple economic attributes of resources, assets and capital as the logic starting points of research. First, it reveals that scarcity and quality difference of the farmland resources, the dispersion of farmland’s utility and information symmetry, then leads to the stakeholder theory and defines the main stakeholders of farmland protection, and based on this, expounds the behavior targets of the farmland protection’s stakeholders. Second, it uses game theory to analyze the non-cooperative game among stakeholders of farmland protection, build the game model between two farmers, farmer and the local government, the central government and the local government. Then, it takes Fujian province as an example for empirical analysis, revealing the contradiction between economic growth and farmland protection which induced by the different targets among multiple stakeholders, and testing the relationship between economic development and environment in Fujian fits the Environmental Kuznets Curve’s characteristics. Finally, according to the analysis conclusion, it proposes some suggestions to establish the incentive and restriction farmland protection mechanism.