Research On The Liability Incentives Of The Edible Agro-products Supply Chain In The Traceability System

An important reason for edible agro-products quality and safety problem is the market failures caused by asymmetric information and responsibilities of non-retroactivity. To establish traceability system of quality for edible agro-products is one of the effective way to achieve full quality control from "farm to fork". At present, the paper about the liability incentives problem among the farmers, enterprises and other actors is less.Therefore, the paper from self-interest point of view to do research about liability incentive problem of main body among the edible agro-products supply chain, not only enrich the results of the edible agro-products supply chain on the incentives for research, at the same time provide a theoretical basis for the Government in formulating policies to promote the healthy development of traceability system,but also has some practical significance.This paper model a traditional supply chain composed of farmers, marketers, firms and consumers, use of mathematical deduction and a case to analysis the liability incentives problem that the main body of supply chain to provide safe edible agro-products.The main ideas are concluded in this research:(1)establish the mode about the liability incentives problem that the main body of supply chain to provide safe edible agro-products;(2)analysis the liability incentives problem that the main body of supply chain to provide safe edible agro-products;(3)a case study of vegetable industry in Chengdu, to analysis the liability incentives problem that the main body of supply chain to provide safe edible agro-products.Through analysis,the paper reached the following conclusions:(1) the main effort of the supply chain depends on the external environment’s requirements for edible agro-products safety. Once the external environment’s requirements for edible agro-products safety (such as food traceability system), the main body of the supply chain have the deeper level of effort to provide safe edible agro-products;(2)the model captures some important features of the creation of liability incentives through better traceability;(3) a potential consequence of the current trend in seeking better traceability is an increase in vertical coordination and integration. Based on the conclusions from the fundamentally, the author provides some policy and suggestion to solve the liability incentives problem that the main body of supply chain to provide safe edible agro-products. Specifically, we should do the following:(1) to develop and improve laws and regulations of the traceability system of quality to ensure the main body of the supply chain to provide safe edible agro-products;(2) use the administrative and legal means to increase the penalties for infringement of consumer behavior;(3) through strengthen government regulation to reduce the income of producers of low quality agro-products and increase its cost of default;(4) speed up the establishment and improvement of the policy system, achieve the change of industry vertical coordination and integration.