Double Game Theory: Analysis Of Taiwan Cross-strait Interaction Of Internal Factors

As a quick illustration, on the topic of observable cross-Strait military activity, unilateral military build-up, such as Beijing’s deployment of ballistic missiles and Taipei’s procurement of arms from the United States, can be understood, through non-cooperative bargaining theory, as moves to strengthen one’s bargaining position by changing the relative costs of non-negotiation. Works that focus on these processes commonly confine the units of analysis and explanatory factors to the interstate dyadic or triadic level, where states are largely black boxed as unitary actors. Yet, as noted above, there is a wide array of observable transnational and domestic processes at play as well. Various scholars have pointed to Robert Putnam’s "two-level game," which is primarily an approach to the levels of analysis question, as a fitting metaphor to the Cross-Strait situation. In this essay, we put the cross-strait relations under the framework of "two-level game" theory to analyze the following case of2012selection in Taiwan. With the help of this study, we hope to identify the different strategies and tactics the DPP Administration and the KMT Administration use for cross-strait issues, and how these strategies vary in different periods. The relative utility of the competing approaches to the levels of analysis question as it pertains to the cross-Strait bargain.