The Economic Analysis Of Some Issues Of Chinese Football System

The professionalism of Chinese football has gone through20years, in the past two decades, the implementation of professionalism had not improved the competitive level of Chinese football, but brought many problems. The first is the decline of competitive level of Chinese football in recent years, the results of Chinese national football team at all levels were showing a downward trend year by year, and has been gradually breaking the football fans’bottom line; The second is the sharp reduction of youth population of Chinese football, the population of youth football player had reached65million in1995, but by2008, the number had reduced to50thousand; The third is the spread of match-fixing, gambling and the proliferation of Referees, these had become the objects of criticisms. All these issues appeared in Chinese football have very negative impacts on the development of Chinese football, so to find the causes of these problems and the ways of getting rid of these problems is very important for the future development of Chinese football. For the various problems appeared in Chinese football, the current system is an important cause, this article mainly use economic theories to analyze the current system of Chinese football, attempts to find the institutional problems from an economic perspective, and then put forward some suggestions for the reform of Chinese football.This article mainly analyzes four major institutions of Chinese football which had been widely criticized, the first is the bureaucracy of Chinese Football Association; the second is Chinese Football Association’s integration of management and operation; the third is the separation of sports and education of the youth training system; the fourth is the illegibility of equity allocation of Chinese Football League.For the bureaucracy of Chinese Football Association, the article mainly use interests of the game theory which belongs to the institutional economics theory to analyze, the analysis reveals that the special bureaucracy nature of Chinese Football Association makes some interests of the game’s problems between Chinese Football Association officials and the Chinese football. For the Chinese football, the diversification of the main interests parts and the football’s own characteristics determine its comprehensive and long-term interests; while for Chinese Football Association officials, Our current evaluation system of government officials determines its single and short-term interests. The interests inconsistency between Chinese Football Association officials and Chinese football makes the interests of the game between them, and the interests of the game then makes Chinese Football Association officials deviate even harm the interests of Chinese football in order to pursue their own interests, this has a very negative impact on the development of Chinese football.For the Chinese Football Association’s integration of management and operation, it means Chinese Football Association is not only the manager of Chinese Football League, but also the operator and regulator of Chinese Football League, this system makes the rights highly concentrated in Chinese Football Association but lack of supervision, this lead to serious corruption problems of Chinese football. This article mainly use the rent-seeking theory which belongs to the institutional economics theory, and aided by corrupt political economics theory to analyze the official corruption of this system.For the illegibility of equity allocation of Chinese Football League, it means Chinese Football Professional League equity is owned by the country, not owned by the professional football club and the Chinese Football Association, this determines the illegibility of equity allocation of Chinese Football League, the equity can’t be defined precisely to an individual. In actual operation, the Chinese Football Association takes the role of agent to exercise the equity of the Football League on behalf of all the citizens. This article mainly use principal-agent theory and property rights theory which belong to the institutional economics theory to analyze this property rights regime, the analysis reveals that such property rights regime had produced certain negative incentives on not only the Chinese Football Association but also the professional clubs.For the separation of sports and education of the youth training system, it means that the youth training system of Chinese football is separated with the education system, this article mainly use the asset specificity theory which belongs to the institutional economics theory to analyze this regime, the analysis reveals that such regime had made the Chinese youth football has a strong human capital specificity, which reduced the enthusiasm of young people to involve in Chinese football, this is an important reason for the sharp decline of the youth population of Chinese football.On the basis of the analysis of several Chinese football institutions, this article made a number of solutions for Chinese football at the last part, including the de-bureaucratization of Chinese Football Association, the power decentralized of Chinese Football Association, the intervention of judicature, the conduct of the campus football league, as well as the further clarity of the equity rights of Chinese Football League, etc., in order to provide some suggestions for the Chinese football reform.