The Study Of Village Official’s Corruption Under Benefit Farming Policy

In recent years, the Party Central Committee and the State Council have attached greatimportance to agriculture, rural areas and farmers, issued a series of beneficial policies forfarmers, supported economic development of agriculture and rural areas, promoted socialprogress in rural areas and increased farmers’ income. However, because there are multipleadministrative levels between the beneficial policies and villagers, the implementation of thepolicies needs to be done in the multiagency relationship of the administrative structure. Thevillage officials, the leaders of village organizations, but also in the basic layer of entrustedagency relationship, who deal with villages directly in the work, are the inevitable part ofimplementing beneficial policies and releasing funds. With the gradual implementation of thenational beneficial agricultural policies and the increasing of funds, village officials as therational “economic man” may put their hands in the beneficial agricultural funds with illegalmeans. Moreover, in addition to the factors such as the information asymmetry of beneficialagricultural policies between village officials and villages, purpose inconsistent between thetwosides, the unsound of supervisory and punishing mechanism, the lack of attention to thebeneficialagriculturalfunds and so on, resulting in the failureofentrusted agencyrelationship ofbeneficial agricultural policies, and thus lead to village officials’ corruption. In recent years,cases that village officials’ corruption occurred in the beneficial agricultural funds causedeconomic losses to the country, hurt feelings of farmers, reduced the credibility of the party andthe government, and restricted the construction of new socialist countryside. Therefore, solvingthe problem ofvillageofficials’corruption in complementationofbeneficialagriculturalpoliciesis a basic work which will unite the people, maintain the stability and promotethe development.This paper will generalize the performance, characteristics and hazards of city A’s villageofficials’corruption in the background of beneficial agricultural policies, and try to analyze thecauses of village officials’ corruption from the perspective of entrusted agency, and expect tofind out the governance mechanisms to solve the problem of corruption under the beneficialagriculturalpolicies background.