Research On Behavior Patterns Of Residents To Deliver E-waste And The Incentive Mechanism

As the Circular Economy and the Sustainable Development strategies were raised, The problem ofe-waste recycling and processing has received the attention of our government gradually. Drawing thelessons from foreign successful experiences, our country will base on the principle of Extended ProducerResponsibility and it has been cleared in the "regulations on the administration of recycling and disposal ofwaste electric and electronic products" that the electronics makers should take-back e-waste by themselvesor entrust other institutions. As the owner of the e-waste----consumers directly determines the flow, whichis vital for the recycling of e-waste. Therefore, exploring the consumers’ behavior characteristics andinfluence factors to deliver e-waste deeply, then making the price strategy for producers and consumersthrough the game analysis in the process of taking back e-waste, and designing the optimal rewards,punishment mechanism, the supervision measures for the government to improve the enthusiasm ofconsumers to participate in e-waste recycling is the core content of this research.First of all, this study chose the residents in Henan province as research objects, based on the TPBtheoretical framework; Using the Factor Analysis to identify the key factors; After introducing thedemographic factors, we explored the effectiveness level of each factor through the Binary LogisticRegression Model and modified the model. Results show that perceived behavior control, environmentalattitude, residue effect are the main factors influencing the consumers’ behavioral intention of delivery,have a significant positive impact and a decreasing influence degree; Subjective norm factors anddemographic factors have not a significant impact. Finally, we compared the results of this study with thedeveloped areas and put forward reasonable suggestions.Then, we established the Stackelberg game model of producers and consumers under completeinformation, found that producers’ repurchase price is related to consumers’ pricing of psychology, andreceived the corresponding sub-game refining Nash equilibrium; Due to static game does not exist in realityunder the complete information, this article established the static game model under the incompleteinformation, to discuss the optimal pricing based on two types of consumers (high cost and low cost) andfound that the psychological pricing of the high cost is low, who has motivation to hind the cost information in order to get higher recovery price; In view of this, we constructed the signaling game modelof incomplete information dynamic game, and received the optimal strategies under the separationequilibrium, blend equilibrium and separate equilibrium, proving that the low cost consumers willundertake extra losses under the blend equilibrium, therefore, we need a corresponding incentive andsupervision of government departments.Finally, we designed the rewards and punishment incentive mechanism on consumers’ behavior ofdelivery under information asymmetry cases, to determine the optimal effort level of consumers anddiscuss the government’s supervision problems under the condition of the incentive mechanism, help thegovernment to weigh the relationship between the costs and benefits of supervision. The results showthat,when consumers’ environmental marginal benefit of delivery e-waste is less than two times of theeconomic marginal revenue, the government need not pay supervision, on the other hand, the lowconsumers’ economic benefits determines that government should strengthen supervision.