Study On Evolutionary Game For The Recyclers Of Waste Electronic Products

With the increasing popularity of electronic products, electronic waste (e-waste) grows rapidly.However, we have not formed an effective e-waste recycling system. Professional enterprisesengaged in the recycling and treatment of e-waste products lack advantage in the recycling price,processing costs and policy support, most of the e-waste is recycled by the informal recycling andtreatment enterprises. Therefore, in order to make the e-waste recycled by professional recyclers,this article mainly research on the incentive mechanism of formal recyclers and restrictionmechanism of informal recyclers.Firstly, a game model of strategy selection between government and the informal recyclers isestablished. For the informal recyclers, two strategies "transformation" and "not transformation "can be chose, and for the government, there are " Regulation " and "not Regulation " strategies. Theanalysis for the evolutionary stability show that: under the market mechanism, the informalrecyclers who pursues the short-term profit maximization will take "not transformation" strategy.Under the government regulation, the strategy selection between government and recyclers showthe periodic characteristics, and recyclers’ strategy selection depend on whether government takes"Regulation" or not.Secondly, in order to explore how to gain the competitive advantage for recyclers, a gamemodel of strategy selection between two recycling population is established and the evolutionarytrend of recycling population strategy selection under different conditions is analyzed, the resultsshow that: from the point of the competition game, it can increase the recycling price, quantity andprofit with the technological innovation, but whether recycler taking “technological innovation” canget competitive advantage or not depends on the technological spillovers rate. From the point of theevolutionary game, when innovation overflow ratio is low, the market’s limited rational recyclersgroup will take the “technology innovation” management model. When technology innovationoverflow ratio is high, recyclers’ strategy selection depends on government’s subsidy amounts. Anumerical case is further used to simulate and analyze the technology innovation efficiency,overflow ratio coefficient, recycling competition, government’s subsidy amounts and otherParameters’ impact to the game equilibrium out come. The results show that: reducing innovationoverflow ratio, increasing government’s subsidy amounts and proper recycling competition can leadmore recyclers to take “technological innovation”.Finally, a Game Model of government and recyclers with different scales by three-stage gameis established. Research shows that government subsidies can effectively reduce the industrythreshold in the process of expanding waste electrical and electronic recyclers, stimulate the enthusiasm of the recycling companies and encourage more small-scale recyclers to form the safehandling of large-scale recyclers, which can effectively reduce the environmental pollution indisposing the e-waste.