Research On Management Strategy Of E-Waste Recyclers From The Perspective Of Evolutionary Game Theory

With the progress of our country's scientific development and the continuous improvement of people's living quality,the scrapped-out electronic products have also rapidly increased.The problems caused by energy crisis,air pollution and ecological imbalance have gradually surfaced.However,at present,our country has not yet successfully constructed a set of e-waste recycling system with distinct levels of legal effect and complete contents.The ways of recycling are scattered and chaotic,and the subjects of participation are also quite different.Due to lack of adequate supply,high recovery costs,inadequate policy mechanisms and inadequate financial subsidies,third-party formal recycling enterprises are hard-pressed to compete with irregular mobile vendors and non-qualified operating organizations,so that most of them Of e-waste are not systematically classified and dismantled.Therefore,based on the insufficient supplies and the lack of competitive advantages of the third-party formal recycling agencies,this paper studies the impact of the government's reward and punishment mechanism on illegal recycling activities,and aims to effectively promote the reform of informal and professional recycling enterprises,And provide reference for our country's construction and regulation of e-waste recycling system.First of all,based on the research results of domestic and foreign scholars on the recycling of waste electronic products,this paper summarizes the research progress of the recycling mode,coordination mechanism,incentive / restraint mechanism and game model of e-waste,and points out that China's waste The Status of Electronic Product Recycling Industry Most electronic waste is collected by mobile vendors and is disassembled and processed non-professionally.However,the third-party formal electronic waste recycling business lacks the price due to competition in the market recovery Advantages,can not be collected to maintain the sound operation of the business of used electronic products,leading to survival difficulties.Secondly,this paper establishes the game model of decision-making between informal recyclers and government when recycling e-waste,assuming that both parties are in a state of limited rationality.In the process of dynamic game,informal recyclers can take two choices: Ecologically-beneficial "reform" programs or sticking to the "no-reform" program.The government also has two options: "control" and "disregarding control." Through the analysis of the evolutionary stability of the game results,we can see that in the case of market competition,the informal recycling business with profit-oriented as the main objective is trying to profit from the present interest and still chooses unstable and irregular trading behavior before.The regulation of the government and the evolution process between the informal recyclers and the government will show a certain regularity and periodicity.At this time,the informal recyclers will be free to decide whether to take a professional or not based on the amount of government rewards and penalties and the strength of the regulation Recycling mode.Then,this paper studies the evolvement of cooperation between non-formal recyclers and third-party recyclers under the rewards and punishments of the government.The results show that the evolutionary direction of the system and the game's payment matrix and the state at the beginning of the game are Inseparable.Among them,the subsidies and random punishments given by the government,excess returns gained by the two parties in choosing cooperation,cooperation costs and loss of cooperation risk are the key variables that affect the choice of cooperation strategy between the two parties.Finally,through the analysis of the evolvement process between informal recyclers and government,third-party recycling companies and informal recycling groups in the game,it points out that it is reasonable to draw up the government subsidies and random penalties to reduce the recovery costs and risks between enterprises Loss and enhance cooperation is the only way to promote cooperation between the informal recycling groups and third-party recycling enterprises and to transform them into specialized ones.