Study On The Evolution Game Of Cooperative Relationships In Dynamic Logistics Alliance Under The Integrated Field Perspective

Logistics has become an important symbol of overall national strength, Logistics industry of China has developed rapidly presently, but small and medium logistics enterprises in general are still in extensive management level. As a new organizational model, Dynamic Logistics Alliance is a priority for the small and the medium logistics enterprises to survive and organization developing. Cooperation and competition influence the Union’s stability throughout the alliance process. Therefore, it is very important and necessary to study the relationship between the games within the dynamic logistics alliance.From the point of integrated field, we can study integrator to explore the logistics chain partnerships and influencing factors, and use the evolutionary game theory to study the partnership. The main contents are as follows:Firstly, to summarize the current status of research on the dynamic logistics alliance partnerships by the dynamic logistics alliance basic research studies, partnerships, evolutionary game application of the relevant literature review and comb is to make an objective assessment. Secondly, by analyzing the evolution of partnership development from the perspective of integrated field and life cycle: formation, development, and stability and transition, we can propose a product-based modular integrated dynamic logistics alliance mode,which is the integrated operation model.Based on the model, we can see the relationship between the game come to integrated logistics providers and functional logistics providers, logistics providers and resource function logistics providers. Furthermore, the paper establishes the evolutionary game model for the corresponding game relationship between integrated logistics providers and logistics providers function of evolutionary game model, we can see: functional logistics providers depend on supervision and management oversight from the logistics providers of integrated logistics provider, in the case of a high probability, it is able to promote functional logistics providers to cooperate actively, and analyze the key factors that influence the stability: the punishment costs, subsidies, income poor and so on. It comes out that oversight of the logistics function’s process should focus on management control and incentive. In the evolutionary game model yields between the integrated logistics business and logistics providers function, we can see: collaborative operation between member companies achieve stability policy relates to the initial probability all the way, when the initial conditions for both choose to cooperate, the ultimate evolutionary stable strategy may cooperate nor is uncooperative, when the probability of both partners is greater than the saddle point value, it will eventually stabilize; when one or both of the initial conditions for the rider to select the final stable strategy for pick-up and analysis of the impact of the model a key factor in the stability of the Union, provide a reference for management recommendations.Finally, we can verify that the process of evolution game is a reasonable by the numerical simulation and the case analysis with Dynamic Logistics Alliance evolutionary game model. For the factors for the model and the actual stabilization policy, from the integrated logistics business promoting active cooperation of member companies, members of themselves two angles to put forward management proposals.