Game Model And Optimization Strategy Of Dual Channel Supply Chain

With the rapid development of internet technology,more and more enterprises begin to explore a possible sale pattern which is beneficial for the long-term development of enterprises. In order to get greater market share and economic benefits, dual channel supply chain has emerged and is distinct from the traditional single retail channel, in which manufacturers and retailers have gradually introduced the electronic direct marking channel into the traditional retail channel. Specifically,when choosing to open the electronic direct marking channel, the supply chain members will meet the unavoidable risk. Therefore, this paper has primarily focused on the crucial issues of dual channel supply chain management.Firstly, there has been little work undertaken on dual channel and short life cycle products in dual channel supply chain, the problem of short life cycle products has been studied in dual channel supply chain. Supposing that the production is a random variable and using the Stackelberg game theory, profit function models have been developed under the centralized and the decentralized decisions. Respectively,Then the optimal ordering and production strategies have been obtained by using backward introduction and a revenue-sharing contract has been designed to try to coordinate the supply chain. Finally, from calculation, we find the revenue-sharing contract is unable to achieve the dual channel supply chain coordination of the short life cycle product.Secondly, the Nash game model has been discussed based on the right equilibrium of manufacturers and retailers and the replacement rate is considered in channel. For the different replacement rates, the game model has been established by using consumer utility function. Then, the optimal service level and optimal price strategies have been proposed under the centralized and decentralized decisions,by applying game theory. Finally, the example is given to show the impact of replacement rate on the optimal service level and price strategy of manufacturer andretailer under two decisions. We obtain: the optimal service level and price of manufacturer and retailer increase with the replacement rate in the centralized decision, yet the optimal service level and price of manufacturer and retailer decrease with the replacement rate in the decentralized decision.