The Game Model Of Real Estate Supply Chain For Agent And Union-agent Research

In this paper,the game of supply chain joint enterprise with real estate union-agent is as the research object,the aim is utmost the system of total real estate supply's revenue,we combine real estate union-agent and supply as the basic of motivation theory,supply chain management,game theory,revolution game and mathematical modeling,this paper formulates primarily three main game models which are real estate agent screening contract model,supply chain revenue model and incentive model under real estate union-agent.Finally,realizing the total real estate supply chain pareto effect optimal by analyzing,solving,numerical value of the model.Specifically,full text includes fives chapters altogether:among them,the second,third and fourth chapters are the most important,the main contents are as follows:The first chapter,introduction:Firstly,this thesis briefly introduces the research background purposes and research significance;Secondly,from two aspects which are real estate with real estate supply chain and real estate agent with real estate union-agent make domestic and international literature review,and define related concepts,theories and methods;And then it summarizes the research method,main content;Finally,points out the innovations.The second chapter,real estate agent screening contract design:To solve the adverse selection problem because of information asymmetry or incomplete,real estate developers through stackelberg game theory design a “tell the truth” incentive mechanism to screen different levels of agent capacity.The third chapter,the model of supply chain revenue under real estate union-agent:On the basis of part II,real estate developer choose two different agents combine union-agent to sign the contract.And union-agent marketing plans for the same development projects,in this condition,there exist two different choices:cooperate or competitive between unionagent and developer,so,real estate supply chain has three games model:1.centralized decision game model,2.decentralized decision game model,3.hybrid decision game model.analysis and solve the revenue of union-agent and developer in this three game model,and come to conclusion.Then,combining practice,a numerical example of model application is presented here.the conclusion of the paper is further verified to obtain the optimum combination scheme which can achieve the total supply chain pareto optimality.The fourth chapter,the incentive model of developer in the supply chain of real estateresearch :The the second and the third chapters;conclusions are all based on the assumption that the fully rational economic man.But in reality,there is no complete rationality.So,this chapter increases the developer's policy of rewards and punishments,the evolutionary game model of developer and real estate union-agent is studied under the condition of imperfect rationality,the dynamic evolution model is obtained by solving the stable equilibrium strategy of the two sides of the game.According to the analysis of the critical point in the evolution model diagram,developer to increase the implementation of incentive and real estate union-agent to respond positively to the developer and the call to achieve the game both sides Pareto effect improvement.The fifth chapter,conclusion and outlook:The whole thesis is concluded with a summary of the main points.Limitations and the direction of further study are also pointed out.