Research On The Regulation Strategy Of Informal Recycling Of Electronic Waste

Along with the progress of science and technology in our country,high and new electronic products update rapidly,the number of electronic waste is increasing,and the recycling industry is also rising.Electronic waste is both a resource and a source of pollution,if not for recycling and processing,it may lead to a waste of resources and environmental pollution.At present,most of electronic waste in our country is recycled by the informal recycling business through informal recycling,in order to make the recycling efficiency of electronic waste more efficient,the effective supervision strategy must put forward for informal recycling channels in our country.Therefore,this paper studies the impact of the government's supervision strategy that the subsidy and the random punishment on the recovery behavior of the informal recycling business,aiming to provide scientific decision making for the establishment of effective recycling channels.First of all,this paper aimed at the problem of supervision of electronic waste recycling industry,based on summarizing the analysis of domestic and foreign related references on electronic waste,pointing out some defects and the further improvement in the study,so as to determine the main contents,research methods and technologies routes of this study.Secondly,the evolutionary game between the government and a single informal recycling business under the random punishment is studied.This paper constructs the evolutionary game model between a single informal recycling business and the government under the random punishment,the evolved stability analysis and the numerical simulation of MATLAB software is used to further verify the effects of the exogenous variables and endogenous variables on the recovery behavior that including the stochastic penalty,subsidy recycling income and so on.On the basis of the above,the scientific and reasonable suggestions are put forward.Then,the evolutionary game between the formal recycling and process enterprise and the informal recycling group is studied.On the basis of the analysis of the related factors among the main recycling bodies,based on the evolutionary game theory,using the demand function of the economics,constructing the evolutionary game between the informal recycling group and informal recycling and process enterprise,and the evolutionary game between the informal recycling group and informal recycling and process enterprise under the random punishment,and the evolved stability analysis is carried out.Finally,through the study of the evolutionary game between a single informal recycling business and government,and between the formal recycling and process enterprise and the informal recycling group,under the random punishment,it is pointed out that the government subsidies and the random punishment are reasonably proposed,which is propitious to the cooperation between the informal recycling group and the formal recycling and process enterprise,and promote the informal recycling channels transform to normalization.