Game Behavior Analysis Between Local Government And The Central Government And Farmers In Rural Homestead Exit

As an important province in the central region,Anhui has been at the forefront of rural reform,and many rural reforms have moved from this origin to the whole country.At present,with the accelerated pace of industrialization and urbanization in China,the contradiction between the allocation of land resources has been highlighted.First,the contradiction between urban development and land use and rural collective construction land is abandoned,the second is the increase of construction land and the protection of cultivated land Of the contradictions,these two contradictions are interrelated,interaction,the key is how to revive the rural collective construction land.Therefore,how to improve the management of rural homestead has become an important part of strengthening the management of rural collective construction land.In this paper,the game theory is used to deduce the game relationship between the central government,the local government and the farmer.On this basis,the paper analyzes the farmer’s behavior and its income in the game.Firstly,it analyzes the research results,literature and evidence related to the exit and circulation of the homestead,and analyzes the changes of the homestead system under different historical and political backgrounds.Introduce the relevant theories,including the theory of homestead management,including definition,property right theory,land resource allocation theory,public policy theory and so on.Secondly,it analyzes the interests of the central government,the local government and the peasant households in the exit of the homestead,and explains the interests of the central government and local governments,local governments and farmers,and analyzes their respective game strategies.The result of the game between the three.Then,in the core content,this paper uses the evolutionary game model to evolve the game behavior of the peasant households in the rural homestead exit,and set the initial strategy.After the government adopts the means of taxation,the results of the evolutionary game are obtained,balance point.This paper analyzes the options of the local government,finds the key problems and the critical points which affect the farmers’ strategy choice and the policy implementation,and verifies the evolutionary game results with the exit case of the village of S village in Huoshan County.Finally,on the basis of the previous theoretical analysis and examples,this paper discusses how to set up the resettlement of the homestead in Anhui Province from the aspects of establishing the protection mechanism of the homestead rights and interests,perfecting the exit of the homestead,improving the utilization efficiency of the homestead and exploring the housing security strategy of urban and rural interaction Specific pathways and policy recommendations.