Benefit Optimization Analysis Of Coal Mine Emergency Management Platform Based On Sequential Game

Safe production is an important foundation for building a harmonious society and safeguarding people's lives.With the development of China's industrialization and market economy,coal mine safety production accidents have received more and more attention from the society.It is related to social stability and healthy economic development.In recent years,the state has taken some strong measures,and the number of safety production accidents has The decline has been made,but the total amount is still too large,and serious accidents have occurred from time to time.The situation of safe production is still quite severe.As a big coal industry,China is also one of the high-incidence countries in coal mine accidents.It is imperative to strengthen the safety production management of the coal mining industry and use advanced information technology to build a safety emergency integration platform.From now to the future,China's fiscal deficit and government debt will increase rapidly and in a huge amount.In recent years,in order to improve the quality of public services,the government has entrusted the public services or management functions originally provided by itself to third-party service providers through contract forms,and paid them with financial funds,which can further reduce the government's financial pressure.At the same time,the service is professionalized by relevant personnel.At the same time,as the country gradually realizes the importance of emergency management,emergency management is booming as an emerging industry.In order to separate the management of government and enterprises,the coal mine emergency management platform is contracted by third-party enterprises.This paper attempts to refer to the Kumar medical information platform model from the perspective of government public service outsourcing,consider the third party enterprise's contribution to the platform,and establish a dynamic game model of the coal mine emergency management platform,which is mainly composed of two aspects:First,in the second part,this paper discusses the optimal network size,optimal pricing,establishment conditions,and net income under equilibrium conditions due to the resource-limited equilibrium conditions of the platform provider in the case of providing only basic services.Give the necessary relevant evidence,and based on the heterogeneity between coal mining enterprises and the cost changes of basic services,numerically analyze the above conclusions,explore the impact of changes,and analyze the factors that promote the scale of the network.Second:This article is based on the results of the second part of the research in the third part of the study.Discuss the optimal network size under the conditions of providing value-added services(wireless communication technology,monitoring system,etc.),as well as the optimal net profit of both the optimal pricing and the game,and provide the necessary relevant evidence to discuss the decisive factors in addition to cost.There are also heterogeneity effects on the two sides of the game,numerical analysis.And analyze the conditions that value-added services can promote the network scale.The innovations of this article are:(1)Refer to Kumar's HIE model to apply the sequential game model to the benefit optimization of the coal mine emergency management platform,and improve the management efficiency through the market-oriented application of the emergency management platform.(2)According to the actual situation,consider the subsidies of the third-party enterprises on the platform in the model,the influence of different parameters on the participation quantity and price,and analyze the optimal order quantity;(3)Considering the stimulating effect of value-added services on the amount of participation,through the solution of the model,the value-added service level and price that can generate incentives are proposed,and policy recommendations are provided.