Research On Incentive Supervision Model Of Engineering Supervision And Related Problems

The project supervision system is an engineering project construction mode introduced into China from western developed countries in the 1980s.Engineering supervision is sometimes called engineering consulting.At present,the engineering supervision system is also one of the four basic engineering construction systems in China.This paper analyzes many defects exposed in the development of China's supervision system,and on the basis of in-depth discussion of China's engineering supervision mechanism,finds that the main factors causing these problems are moral hazard and the credit level of engineering supervision enterprise.In the construction process of engineering projects,the construction supervision contract is incomplete due to information asymmetry and other reasons,and the trend of profit of enterprises(or individuals)leads to the existence of bilateral moral hazard between the construction management of engineering projects and the construction supervision enterprises(or engineering supervision engineers).The degree of effort of the engineering supervision enterprises directly the income of owners.Of course,it is directly related to the success or failure of the project,and the evaluation of the level of effort of engineering supervision enterprises has a lag.The main work of this paper is to establish a model of incentive and supervision based on bilateral moral hazard to provide theoretical support for the owners to make scientific and reasonable incentive contracts.On the other hand,the real-time credit system of engineering supervision enterprises is established to avoid adverse selection for the owners in the bidding process.This paper first studies how project owners formulate contract strategies from the perspectives of incentive and supervision,so as to ensure that the project supervision enterprises will work hard for the maxrrnum interests of the owners,so as to control or eliminate the moral hazard of project supervision in the construction process.On the basis of considering the risk aversion attitude of both the owner and the project supervisor,this paper breaks through the traditional principal-agent theory,integrates the supervision cost of the owner and the reward and punishment mechanism into the incentive model construction,and constructs the random optimization model of the incentive and supervision of the project supervision under the condition of asymmetric information.By solving the model;To contain the reward and punishment coefficient,the optimal target and task reference value and the optimal effort degree of the project supervision enterprise when the utility maximizes in the project construction project.At the same time,the relationship among the effort degree,cost coefficient,risk aversion degree and owner's reward and punishment intensity coefficient of the project supervision enterprise is analyzed.The main contribution of this paper lies in the establishment of the mathematical model of incentive and supervision mechanism of engineering supervision,which lays a solid foundation for the research of incentive and supervision mechanism of engineering supervision.Then,from the perspective of all stakeholders,this paper establishes a fuzzy comprehensive evaluation model by using interval intuitionistic fuzzy set,and makes a systematic and comprehensive scientific evaluation on the reputation of supervision enterprises.The model mainly determines the weight of each stakeholder and the weight of reputation evaluation index system through similarity value and precision function,and aggregates the corresponding interval intuitionistic fuzzy information using ?FHG and other operators.This not only fully reflects the voice rights of all stakeholders in the evaluation system,but also avoids the deviation caused by the subjective preference of a single object.