Research On The Game Model Of The Interest Subject Of Urban Parking Management

On-street parking lots have the advantages of "less investment" and "fast results",and are more convenient than off-street parking lots.In order to better manage the on-street parking lots and take advantage of the resources of the on-street parking lots,more and more parking lot managers have begun to cooperate with parking lot operators.This article will solve the problems of the current chaotic cooperation between on-street parking managers and operators,and the lack of research on the main stakeholders of urban parking governance,providing theoretical basis and basic support for the solution of urban parking governance in China.Based on the stakeholder theory,this paper analyzes the subjects of urban parking governance and determines the roles of different stakeholders in urban parking governance.In the current urban parking governance,managers and operators are still the main roles.The current cooperation models between managers and operators in the field of on-street parking governance are summarized into three types.The role,actual case and cooperation process were studied.In this paper,in order to study the game behavior of managers and operators in the process of two-party game,based on game theory,principal-agent theory,consumer surplus theory and producer surplus theory,etc.,the construction of contract operation mode,government purchase service mode and PPP mode is constructed.The two-party game model of the manager and the operator solves and analyzes the game model of the manager and the operator based on the game equilibrium point,incentive ratio,franchise period and other factors.The choice of the parking demand is the main factor that determines the parking income.Considering the impact of the parking price,parking time and other factors on the parking demand behavior of the parking demand,a binomial Logit model is constructed.Then a three-party game model with parking demand,managers and operators as participants is constructed based on the parking demand choice behavior,and a profit function is constructed for different cooperation modes of managers and operators.Through case analysis,it is found that in the current parking governance model,the price adjustment can make the manager and operator's income under the purchase service model are positive,but for the other two models,the manager's income changes before and after the price adjustment Not large,the operator's earnings vary greatly.The benefits of parking demand are not affected by the cooperation model of managers and operators.The research in this paper can provide data support for managers and operators in the cooperation of on-street parking lot management,and propose improvement measures for problems that may arise during the cooperation process.