Research On Suppliers Evaluation And Coordination Strategy Of Prefabricated Building Component

The development of construction industry is closely related to China’s economy.It is an inevitable choice for China’s construction industry to take the road of prefabricated construction and realize the industrialization of construction.As an important part of the prefabricated building supply chain,component supplier determines the smooth progress of the production,transportation,installation and maintenance of building components.However,China’s fabricated building component manufacturing market is mixed and lacks an effective evaluation system.The level of cooperation and management between developers and suppliers is low,the awareness of sharing interests and risks is weak,and the supply chain management is not yet mature.Therefore,this thesis studies the scientific evaluation system of component suppliers,establishes a set of effective cooperation access screening mechanism,and further discusses how to play the role of government supervision,actively promote the formation of a partnership between developers and suppliers for effective cooperation and improve the level of supply chain management.This thesis firstly proposes a component supplier evaluation method based on the dominance rough set in view of the expected component supplier evaluation method,combined with the characteristics of prefabricated buildings.The comprehensive index system of supplier evaluation is established,and the sample data is established according to the analytic hierarchy process and expert scoring method.The data is preprocessed by using dominance-based rough set approach,and the core attribute and supplier selection decision rule set are obtained,and the validity of the method is proved by cross verification test,which lays the foundation for subsequent research.Secondly,this thesis analyzes the supplier evaluation and cooperation relationship,establishes the cooperation scenario,and introduces the evaluation results into the two-party game model.The quantitative analysis shows that the game between developers and suppliers is finally trapped in the prisoner’s dilemma,which has no obvious effect on promoting the establishment of a cooperation relationship.To further explore the cooperative relationship,the model is optimized.This thesis builds a tripartite evolutionary game model among the government,prefabricated building developers,and component suppliers,which the government plays the supervising role and the latter two cooperate.After analyzing the behavioral strategies selection of the three-party,simulation experiments are conducted with MATLAB to examine the factors and internal mechanisms influencing the cooperation between developers and suppliers,and the government’s active supervision.The results show that,compared with the government supervision and the developer’s cooperation willingness,the supplier’s cooperation willingness,if properly improved,plays the most obvious role in evolving the tripartite system to a balanced state.Additionally,the government’s increase in subsidies and fines is not a panacea for effective supervision,the mutual relationship of the risk cost,the fine,and the subsidy require a more reasonable investigation.The strategy selection probability and excess return have positive influences on the system’s evolution to the optimal state of equilibrium,while the supervision cost,coordination cost,and risk cost have negative influences.Besides,the influence of risk cost is more obvious than the coordination cost.Finally,according to the research results,some suggestions are put forward.Through the research of this thesis,an effective method of prefabricated component supplier evaluation is explored,and the internal mechanism of government supervision and active cooperation between developers and suppliers is analyzed by using evolutionary game theory,which provides a useful reference for the healthy development of prefabricated building market.