Analysis On The Supply Of Spilled Environmental Public Goods From The Perspective Of Inter-governmental Game

Since the reform of the tax system,China has gradually formed a Chinese-style fiscal system in which political centralization and fiscal decentralization coexist.While mobilizing the enthusiasm of local government economic development,only the dual political and economic incentives of GDP distorted the essence of economic development and government governance.The mismatch between local governments in terms of financial power and administrative rights also makes it impossible for financial resources to meet the needs of a large number of power expenditures.Under China's fiscal decentralization system,the decentralization between the central government and local governments at all levels is based on their respective administrative rights.As a "rational economic man" in the political field,governments at all levels are driven by interests to carry out inter-governmental games and scale competition with "non-public interest" as value-oriented.In the order of action and interest game,due to various considerations such as cost,benefit and work tasks,there are different levels of horizontal and vertical inter-governmental games,and the responsibilities are unclear and intertwined.There is a serious problem of inefficient supply of public goods,especially public goods with obvious spillovers represented by environmental public goods.This paper introduces research problems based on the definition of basic concepts and related theories.It lays the basic perspective and theoretical framework for the analysis of the mechanism and model of vertical and horizontal inter-govermental games.Through the empirical analysis of the status quo of environmental public goods supply,this paper summarizes the supply dilemma of spillover public goods caused by the inter-govermental game in China,mainly including the divisional management system leading to inter-provincial limited trust,fiscal decentralization leading to mismatch and incentive distortion,local government self-interested attitude leading to short-sighted decision-making and the lack of legal system leads to the frequent occurrence of free-riding.Then the paper discusses the optimization path and institutional arrangement of the supply of spillover environmental public goods in the level of consciousness transformation,system construction and capacity building.Finally,the related researches in this paper are summarized and the shortcomings of this paper are analyzed.The importance of the supply of spilled environmental public goods in China is emphasized.The research significance and future research directions of this paper are prospected.Insufficient supply of spilled environmental public goods is the result of constant game and incentive distortion between different governments.Under the Chinese fiscal decentralization system and the promotion model of governmental officials,the supply of environmental public goods is often neglected because of its obvious spillover.Therefore,studying the inter-governmental game behavior and co-opetition order under the Chinese-style government system and the decentralization system is undoubtedly of great significance for rationally dividing the dimensions of financial power and the allocation of administrative rights,improving the supply and governance mechanism of public goods;On the other hand,environmental public goods as the most fair public goods and the most popular welfare of the people,the overall layout of the five-sphere integrated in the new era calls for the transformation of the government's public goods supply and management model.The goal of building an ecological civilization and beautiful China is a test of transforming governmental functions rationally,determining public responsibility clearly and positioning governmental role accurately.