| With the rapid development of science and technology, humans have fully entered the era of globalization. Globalization likes a "double-edged sword", which has brought new challenges while it enhances the world’s exchanges. Global problems such as global warming, international financial crisis, infectious diseases, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and international terrorism have become common problems faced by the whole world. The process to solve these problems is often the process of supplying international public goods, which has been an integral part of the globalization. The world’s demand for international public goods is increasing while there is a serious shortage in supply; the contradiction between supply and demand is growing. Therefore, how to effectively solve this contradiction beyond traditional sovereign states category in the globalization tide is becoming the jointly task with challenges for every nation, including China. The current international public goods mainly provided by developed countries, while China’s participation is not enough. Actively involved in the international public goods supply and international governance accords with China’s interests of maintaining the fast development pace, as well as to establish the image of "a responsible big country" and to occupy the moral high ground, which also creates the opportunity for China to catch up with developed countries. Therefore, we should strengthen the research on the theory of international public goods supply, in order to provide guidance of active participation in international public goods and to speed up the process of globalization.The study of international public goods in China started relatively late (Fan et al., 2003) and it mainly confined to the basic concepts research, policies and measures, or only for specific public goods analysis, which is lack of system economic researches. At the same time, domestic scholars mainly used the method of politics and international relations to discuss this problem more than economic method (Fan, 2008,2011; Cai,2011). Usually, research achievements of foreign scholars are on behalf of the interests of developed countries. Therefore, it should be viewed in a dialectical attitude while applying those theories to China’s reality as well as the numerous developing countries under the background of globalization. At the same time, the existing researches mainly based on static and non-cooperative game theory framework, lacking of cooperative game researches or dynamic analysis. This paper builds the research framework of game theory, using the theory of international public goods to study the problem of international public goods supply in-depth, analyzing the main influencing factors of international public goods supply and international cooperation and expounding the causes and mechanism of the game difficulty. This paper seeks for the corresponding cracks and the answers to the following questions. (1) The international public goods with different natures should provided by whom and how to provide them? (2) What is the cause of the predicament of international public goods supply? What specific factors affect the formation of international cooperation? (3) What conditions and methods could make non-cooperative game transform to the cooperative game? (4) How to make income distribution and cost allocation in the existing cooperation of international public goods supply? What are conditions and measures for maintaining cooperation?This paper includes 7 chapters, except the first chapter, the second, third and fourth chapters are theoretical analysis; the fifth and sixth chapters are empirical analysis; and the seventh chapter is the conclusions and policy recommendations.Chapter 1 is the introduction, which mainly presents research problem origins, research methods and ideas, and definds the related concepts.Chapter 2 is the literature review, which clears up contents and achievements of three parts:the basic theory of international public goods, the general research and the game analysis of international public goods supply, international environmental governance in general and game theory research, etc. The representative literatures in the field are discussed and given a brief common.Chapter 3 is the non-cooperative game theory of international public goods supply. This chapter mainly studies the international public goods supply in the non-cooperative game, focusing on related interest subjects and participating countries how to carry on the decision-making behavior, in order to realize their optimal strategy choice. Firstly it studies the prisoner’s dilemma which is the most common and the most representative model in international public goods supply, analyzes the individual "rational" brings the collective irrationality in this situation. Secondly, the aggregation technology of four kinds of international public goods supply mode combined with different properties are analyzed, on the basis of which the participating countries’ strategy choices of cooperation or betrayal and the cooperation equilibrium formation conditions are discussed. Thirdly, a mathematical deduction of general model of non-cooperative game is given. Then it makes the comparison of the Nash equilibrium and Pareto optimality of international differences in the public goods supply levels and the alternative and complementary relationship between strategic behaviors. Finally, the leadership behaviors model is introduced to the international public goods supply.Chapter 4 is the cooperative game theory of international public goods supply, which mainly focus on the problem of income distribution. First it discusses the relationship between the "bargain" and cooperation, studies the transformation process of the non-cooperation to the cooperation, finds the Nash equilibrium of cooperative game between the two countries in the bargaining problems and determines the "disagree point". Then the chapter studies on the default in cooperation and the result to renegotiate, when the "equilibrium to prevent renegotiation" is deduced. As a result, rewarding the commitment and punishing defectors alone could ensure the continual cooperation. Finally, it analyzes the international league game of international public goods supply, and through the way of solving "core" and Shapley value it calculates the satisfying scheme for the income distribution in the alliance or cost allocation.Chapter 5 is the case study for international environment public goods supply Ⅰ. This part firstly reviews the current dominant governance mechanism in the global greenhouse gas emissions and global climate-the United Nations framework convention on climate change and the formation of the global climate conference. Then it views participate countries in the climate governance owns equal ability and equal status of rational individuals, on the basis of using the linear aggregation technology to analyze the causes of dilemma, while introducing the minimum threshold technology, compensation mechanism and the cost sharing mechanism for discussing how to transform non-cooperative game to cooperative game. Thirdly, it introduces the division of interest groups to distinguish between the different economic strength and the ability difference between participate countries, then mainly analyzes the game relation in climate governance between developed countries and developing countries, and analyzes the game among developing countries as well. Fourthly, the framework convention and the Nash equilibrium in bargaining with the plight of repeated game are analyzed and studied. Lastly, uses league game model to analyze the status of different countries in the global environment facility, further points out the causes of the formation of non-cooperation.Chapter 6 is the case study for international environment public goods supply Ⅱ:the international cooperation governance of Rhine, which is a typical successful case. Firstly this part reviews the history of Rhine’s polluted and governance process. Next it uses weighted aggregation technology model for existing game in the cooperation of the Rhine, especially the strategy choices of participating countries before and after the "Santos Event". Thirdly, it compares the differences in the level of international environmental public goods supply between Nash equilibrium and Pareto optimality condition in the governance process, point out that the supply of related participating countries under the Nash equilibrium is less than that under the Pareto optimality condition, and this gap will increase with the number of participating countries. Lastly, it discusses the bargaining behaviors in the cooperation process and analyzes the cost allocation by using the league game.Chapter 7 is the conclusions and recommendations. This part response to the preliminaries four problems, and considers the strategy for China in the international public goods supply, then it proposes the policy suggestions to promote the cooperation, cracking game dilemma.Innovations of the research mainly embody on:(1) Abandon the original method in a cooperative game framework to study the paradigm of international public goods supply problem, and use a brand new framework which contains the non-cooperative and cooperative game theory method to this problem and put forward the countermeasures that the get rid of the dilemma. Paper has carried on the supplement to the drawback of the existing research, has innovation in introducing relevant cooperation game model under the condition of international public goods supply problem. It puts forward how to make the agreement of bargaining, how to use the reward measures to keep the promise or punish the betrayal behaviors, how to eliminate the deviation of non-cooperation and renegotiate incentives, and use "core" solution and Shapley value as the international cooperation scheme that every countries can accept together.(2) This dissertation brokers the predominantly static game research methods and combines the study with dynamic games. International cooperation often has action sequence in the process, and therefore, the static analysis is not well simulated to the real problem. The paper mainly adopts the bargaining model, "prevent to renegotiate model" and repeated game model, as well as the strategy selection probability of participating countries discussed in dynamic course (ie., mixed strategy game model), which are carried out analysis of international public goods supply problem These models make well explain for cooperation and negotiation in a dynamic process, the strategic interaction between the participating countries and the cooperation prospect.(3) This dissertation is the interdiscip linary theoretical research with an emphasis on economics, based on the theory of public goods. It adopts the method of game theory combines with international relations and political science. It analyzes two typical and comparative cases:greenhouse gas emissions reduction that attract more scholars both at home and abroad, but mainly from the environment and international relations’ angle, rarely with public goods perspective analysis; and the international governance of water pollution of the Rhine, which is an successful case of international cooperation, but to which scholars pay less attention. It finds out that the public goods’nature, the number of countries, participating ability differences, the existence of the leading countries, and the relationship between the national income and international income have influence in the development of cooperation. |
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