A Study On The Decision-making Behavior Of Government Subjects In Regional Tourism Cooperation

In order to further promote regional tourism cooperation and achieve economic development,it is necessary to study the decision-making behavior of government subjects in cooperation.This study has important practical significance and value.This paper studies the decision-making behavior of government subject in regional tourism cooperation and the game relationship between government subject in regional cooperation.On the premise of welfare type and broker,and based on Pareto's goal of improvement,this paper analyses the constraints of government subject's decision-making behavior(tourism market conditions,similarity or difference or homogeneity of resources,convenient transportation).With the help of evolutionary game model and under the hypothesis of "welfare-oriented" local government,the equilibrium point of the game is analyzed by constructing evolutionary replication dynamic equation.It is found that when the sum of cooperative revenue and dominant cooperation increase revenue is less than the total cost of cooperation,non-cooperation is the strategy of evolutionary stability of the two regions.When the sum of the benefits of cooperation and the total cost of cooperation increases in one region,and the benefits of the dominant cooperation in another region are less than the cost of allocation,the region will choose to promote cooperation,while the other region will choose non-cooperation as an evolutionary stabilization strategy.When the profit of dominant cooperation is greater than the cost of its allocation,cooperation becomes an evolutionary stabilization strategy for the two regions.Under the hypothesis of "economic human" local government,when the sum of cooperation revenue and dominant cooperation increase revenue is less than the total cost of cooperation,no matter what the growth rate of cooperation performance is,non-cooperation between the two regions is an evolutionary and stable strategy.When the sum of the benefits of cooperation and leading cooperation is greater than the total cost of cooperation,and the benefits of leading cooperation in another region are less than its cost-sharing,and the growth rate of its own performance is greater than or equal to that of the other region,this region chooses cooperation,while the other region chooses non-cooperation,that is(cooperation,non-cooperation)or(non-cooperation,cooperation)to become stable evolution.Set strategy.When the profit of leading cooperation is greater than the cost of sharing,the two regions will choose to cooperate,but it is impossible for the two sides to cooperate to bring their own performance growth faster than the other side at the same time.However,when the performance growth rate of cooperation equals the other side,it can be accepted by both sides,but whether to promote or allocate depends on other conditions.Finally,this paper uses the basic methods of economics and game theory toanalyze the decision-making behavior of government subjects in the process of regional tourism cooperation in Wuling Mountains.It reveals the lack of coordination system of regional tourism cooperation in Wuling Mountains,the weak sense of cooperation among local government subjects in the process of regional tourism cooperation,the high cost of cooperation among local government subjects in the process of decision-making,and the region.The problems of low legalization of regional tourism cooperation and lack of assessment system of regional tourism cooperation are discussed.Some suggestions are put forward,such as transforming the promotion contract into promotion action,giving full play to the leading position of regional tourism,leading regional tourism cooperation,adopting comprehensive means,reducing the total cost of cooperation,and promulgating laws and regulations of regional tourism cooperation.