The Influence Of Government's "Hidden Hierarchy" On The Redistribution Of Urban Interests From The Perspective Of Intergovernmental Cooperation In Urban Agglomeration

The barrier-free flow of resources and factors of production is the essential requirement of regional integration under the market-oriented.However,such a conclusion that market allocation of resources promotes regional integration may not be applicable to regional economy with rigid constraints of administrative divisions.Especially in the case of conflicts of intergovernmental interests,local governments through administrative intervention hinder the market-oriented allocation of resources in order to seek their own interests,which seriously hinders the deepening of the process of regional integration in China.We choose Yangtze River Delta urban agglomerations as an example,taking "Documentation Combing-Theoretical Analysis-Current Situation Measurement-Empirical Analysis-Suggestions" as the Basic Idea.Collecting data of 26 cities in Yangtze River Delta urban agglomerations in 2007-2016 years,constructing a Comprehensive Evaluation System of “hidden hierarchy” of Local Government by Entropy Weight TOPSIS Method.At the same time,combined with Markov transfer probability matrix and ESDA method,the temporal and spatial pattern evolution and intergovernmental characteristics of Yangtze River Delta urban agglomerations are discussed.Finally,we use the two-way fixed effect model to analyze the influence factors of the " hidden hierarchy" of the government on the distribution of intergovernmental interests,and then put forward relevant opinions and suggestions.Firstly,based on the relevant theories of regional economics,new economic geography and public administration,this paper combs the domestic and foreign literature in recent years from the vertical relationship between central and local governments and the horizontal relationship between local governments.It is found that few scholars have studied the relationship of interests and the mechanism of occurrence of various intergovernmental subjects from the perspective of game and trade-off,and have never considered the influence of game perspective brought about by the difference of government endowments.From the perspective of research,it is customary to regard regional intergovernmental relations and local government relations as a unified whole of interests,and to have a brief taste of the inherent contradictions of interests and the distribution of interests of the government.Therefore,taking the Yangtze River Delta urban agglomerations as an example,this paper studies the issue of inter governmental cooperation and urban redistribution of interests based on theory and practice.Secondly,from the perspective of game analysis and theory,this paper analyses the contradiction of government's internal interests and the distribution of intergovernmental interests.It is believed that to promote intercity cooperation and regional integration of urban agglomeration,five contradictions should be resolved first: first,the contradiction between profit seeking behavior in high level areas and the trend of regional cooperation;two,the contradiction between the failure of regional policies and the effect of "rent seeking";three,the contradiction between the dominant government's decision-making tendency and the central expectation;four,the contradiction between the term of office and the length of investment is not matched.five,the contradiction between the interests of the government and the private interests of individuals is inconsistent,and seven corollaries are formed.Again,the comprehensive evaluation system of "hidden hierarchy" of local governments in urban agglomerations is constructed.By combing relevant documents and theoretical data,following the construction principles of index system,we choose 27 indicators from 7 aspects: economic scale,efficiency level,structure level,growth rate,people's life,opening to the outside world and administrative efficiency,construct the evaluation index system of government's "hidden hierarchy",and measure the comprehensive evaluation value of the government's "hidden hierarchy" in the Yangtze River Delta urban agglomerations.Then,from the perspective of spatial analysis and empirical analysis,the government's "hidden hierarchy" and the characteristics of space-time pattern of Yangtze River Delta urban agglomerations are evaluated and analyzed.The analysis shows that the Yangtze River Delta urban agglomerations is significantly affected by the relative hierarchy game,and the local government's cooperation enthusiasm is weak,and the inter governmental level rigidity is remarkable.In the past 2007-2016 years,there was no obvious change of government hierarchy in the Yangtze River Delta region.Then,from the perspective of econometric analysis and empirical research,this paper makes an empirical study on the relationship between the "hidden hierarchy" of the government and the distribution of intergovernmental interests.The results show that the higher the hidden rank,the stronger the tendency of local governments to take competitive decisions.And in the process of decision-making,the more concerned they are about whether the interests of officials and government are satisfied.At the same time,it is considered that there are two reasons for the slow integration of the Yangtze River Delta urban agglomerations : one is to ignore the rigidity of the "hidden hierarchy" of the local government;the two is to ignore the local officials' interests in the decision-making process and the interests of the government.Finally,on the basis of the previous theoretical and empirical analysis,this paper elaborates the central macro-policy formulation ideas from the three levels of intergovernmental mutual benefit,transaction cost and Intra-governmental coordination,providing reference for the promotion of intergovernmental cooperation.And,aiming at the shortcomings of this paper,some suggestions for further improvement are put forward.