Research On The Dilemma And Policy Advice Of Local Government Investment Supervision

Government investment plays an important role in stimulating local economic growth just like an engine.However,the government investment supervision system is the key to driving this engine.Since the Reform and Opening started,it is significant that the investment and financing of local governments in China have been expanded quite larger in terms of scale,field,and effects among market economic system.However,due to relevant institutional®ime reasons,the government investment supervision system has long been marginalized,and it has not been able to ensure the legality and compliance of many local government investment projects,resulting in a series of regulatory dilemmas such as deterioration of responsibility,inefficient supervision and failure of regulatory instruments.On the basis of summarizing the existing interpretation framework,based on the institutional background and the actual case(Tram-Line 1),the paper uses the "Ambiguity-Conflict" policy analysis model to explain the causes for the dilemma of investment supervision of Zhuhai Government from the perspective of policy implementation.Expanded system analysis.This article argues that the dilemma of investment supervision in Zhuhai Government mainly includes the fuzzy generalization of regulatory norms,the lack of capability of integration and refinement of government;the exclusion process of motion decision-making,resulting in a state of periphery of regulation;the fragmentation of regulatory system,the lack of supervisory capacity of the department;the fuzzy relational inversion of supervision and management,the negative externality of conflicts of regulation;the interest conflict in standard control of financial expenditure,leading serious waste of financial resources,etc.This paper builds a "dual fuzzy-conflict" model that covers the central-local government internal-social public participation and believes that the main cause of the dilemma is that the client has some predicaments such as passivity,emergency and repeatability in building regulatory policy goals.At the same time,there are problems in the inconsistency of the internal interests of the agents when the supervisors of the parties implement the supervisory policies,and the dual entrusted agent logic makes the implementation of the policies lower.As a result,the overall structure of the local government investment supervision system is unable to form a joint force,resulting in the above-mentioned series of difficulties.Combining with the reality of governance reforms in Zhuhai Government in the future,the paper proposes the following four suggestions.Improve the scientific decision-making mechanism and strengthen the management of project decision-making;Rationalize departmental responsibilities and strengthen the responsibility for coordinating and realizing the responsibilities;Improve the project reserve system and control the investment decision-making power;And moreover,to innovate regulatory policy tools for motivating and monitoring due diligence.