Study On The Effective Threshold Of Rural Residents' Voluntary Compensatory Withdrawal

At present,the shortage of urban construction land limits the social and economic development of our country.At the same time,the expansion of the city occupies a large number of basic farmland around the city,threatening China's food security.In order to ease the contradiction between urban and rural construction land(occupation of construction land and farmland protection)and promote rural revitalization,the implementation and promotion of homestead voluntary withdraw policy is extremely urgent.The paid exit of homestead is a major reform decision that affects people's livelihood.Not only it benefits the intensive use of land resources in rural areas,but also quickly activates land assets and accelerates the construction of rural land markets,thus realizing the sustainable development of the rural economy.Of course,the voluntary fee-based exit of house sites is systematically stronger,and the reform system needs overall design.This study aims to determine the effective threshold of homestead voluntary paid exit by summarizing the innovative practical experience of the pilot area.This study provides a basis for the party and the government to optimize homestead management,and provides safeguards for the protection of farmer households' legal rights.This article measures the compensation value of the voluntary paid exit from the homestead in the pilot area.According to the principles of collective sustainability,peasant household acceptance,and work sustainability,cost-benefit method,willingness survey method,and other methods will be used to scientifically determine the effective thresholds of compensation for different types of rural households when their homesteads are voluntarily withdrawn under different exit modes.The conclusion shows:(1)Different exit models will be adopted for different regions to provide differentiated compensation standards to meet the willingness of different groups of people to compensate for the fair and efficient implementation of homestead exit.The actual compensation value given by the government when the homestead exits is equivalent to a minimum threshold of 8303.4 yuan.It is the compensation scope composed of the minimum value that the farmers can accept and the maximum value that the government can bear.The actual compensation value is between the government and the farmers on the basis of voluntary withdrawal and fair exit.The value determined by the game.(2)The minimum threshold for farmers' exit is greater than the sum of their total exit costs and lost opportunity costs,otherwise the farmers will not withdraw;the maximum threshold for exit homestead compensation should be lower than the right of homestead and its ancillary facilities lost by the farmers themselves.The sum of the value and the total cost of withdrawal,otherwise the government pressure is too large to bear the corresponding compensation.(3)The reasonable compensation threshold for farmer A in the “relocation in other place” mode is 8303.4 to 100221 yuan,and the median value is 54262.2 yuan.Actually,the government did not give any compensation.Under this model,the source of funds is relatively small.During the game,the government is in a dominant position,and the actual compensation value tends to the minimum threshold.The reasonable compensation threshold for farmer B households under the “one-family multiple-occupancy” model is 9682.3~38194.3 yuan,with a median value of 24098.3 yuan,and the actual compensation obtained is 29502.3 yuan.Under this model,the interests of both parties are equal,and the actual compensation value tends to a median value.The reasonable compensation threshold for farmer C households in the “total relocation”model is 102040~264770.8 yuan,with a median value of 183405.4 yuan,and the actual compensation obtained is 245524 yuan.The reasonable compensation threshold for farmer D in the “community” model is 176326~415969.5 yuan,with a median value of 296147.7 yuan,and the actual compensation obtained is 398850 yuan.Under the “overall relocation” and “communitybased” model,there are many sources of compensation funds.During the game process,farmers are in a dominant position,and the actual compensation value tends to be the maximum threshold.(4)Although the reform of urban housing sites in Yicheng has achieved remarkable results,there are many restrictive factors.There are still problems in the following areas: compensation is unfair and fair,rehabilitation and utilization are inefficient,and compensation funds are insufficient.The recommendations are as follows: The implementation of the homestead exit policy must abide by the three principles of “legal,voluntary,and paid” that are withdrawn,adapt to local conditions,and implement measures by the village.At the same time,we need to innovate the financing channels,and stabilize the sources of funds.In order to ensure the efficient and smooth exit of the homestead.