Research On The Quality And Safety Supervision Of Agricultural Products Considering Farmers' Behaviors Preference And Government Regulation

The quality and safety of agricultural products have always been the focus of the government and the general public in China.However,problems such as imperfect market mechanisms and failure of government regulations in the process of quality and safety control of agricultural products in China are still prominent.Due to the frequent occurrence of quality and safety events of agricultural products caused by unsafe production behaviors of farmers,the behavioral preferences of farmers have further deepened the complexity of farmers' decision-making behaviors under the pattern of the decentralized operation.Therefore,from the perspective of behavioral economics,it is of great theoretical and practical significance to study the influence mechanism of farmers' behavior preferences and government regulations on agricultural product quality and safety supervision.This study comprehensively used behavioral economics,evolutionary game theory and other theories to study the impact of farmers' behavior preferences and government regulations on quality and safety,in order to provide a certain decision-making reference for improving the quality and governance of agricultural products in China.The main research contents of this paper include:Firstly,this paper constructed the game model of agricultural product quality and safety supervision and the influence model of farmers' production behaviors under the government subsidy mechanism by adding the prospect theory respectively.On this basis,the influence of different parameters on the evolutionary game path and results is analyzed by numerical simulation.The results show that:(1)The key to the production behaviors of farmers is the sensitivity degree of quality safety loss,the value perception of the difference between high quality and low quality agricultural products;(2)The decision of the farmer's risk preferences is affected by government subsidy incentives;(3)Under the"company+farmer"supply chain mode,the quality and safety supervision of agricultural products falls into the dilemma of"low quality and inefficiency".Secondly,this paper put the fairness preference into the evolutionary game model in order to further explore the influential mechanism of farmers' fairness preference and government regulation on quality supervision in the supply chain mode of "company + agricultural cooperatives + farmers",and on this basis,the influence of parameter changes on the evolutionary results is analyzed.The results show that:(1)The influence of farmer's fair preference psychology on the quality and safety of agricultural products is mainly reflected in the "regulation" farmer's jealousy mentality and the "speculation" farmer's guilty mentality.(2)The effect of government regulation is dictated by the initial population size of farmers choosing"legally production"strategies.(3)The higher initial population size of the farmers,the higher yield difference between farmers' production and low quality agricultural products,and the lower additional cost of producing high-quality agricultural products all contribute to cooperative farmers to the evolution of cooperative farmers toward"legally production".Finally,this paper put forward the following policy recommendations:(1)The government should change the mind,and design a multi-body,multi-central regulatory model.(2)Adopting the formal and informal governance model can have effects on managing different preferences of different types of farmers.(3)The government should address the quality and safety of agricultural products in the form of "development".