Analysis On Price Decision Of Dual Channel Supply Chain With Altruistic Preference In Different Game Structures

Supply chain management has always been one of the important areas of management research,and scholars have explored the dual-channel supply chain more and more in recent years.With the rapid development of Internet technology,the number of consumers shopping through online channels is increasing.Therefore,enterprises have transformed into dual channels,hoping to sell products through traditional channels and online channels at the same time to enhance their competitiveness and expand market share.In the past research,most people regarded decision makers as completely rational,but with the continuous development of behavioral economics,people gradually realize that decision makers are not completely rational and will be affected by behavioral factors.Therefore,this paper introduces a kind of behavioral factor of decision makers-altruistic preference into the dual channel supply chain.In addition,in order to obtain maximum profits,members of the supply chain will inevitably play game when they cooperate,and different game structures will have influence on their decisions.In view of the above analysis,this paper takes the two-level supply chain consisting of a single supplier and a single retailer with altruistic preference attribute as the research object,considering the situation that the supplier uses the dual channel for sales.This paper constructs a pricing model in the three game structures of supplier-led,retailer-led and Nash-balanced,solves separately and conducts comparative analysis to explore the influence of altruistic preferences and different game structures on channel pricing,profit and efficiency.Through analysis,the following main conclusions are obtained:(1)The direct selling price is not influenced by altruistic preference and game structures.(2)The wholesale price is inversely proportional to the degree of supplier's altruistic preference and proportional to the degree of retailer's altruistic preference,and it is the highest when the supplier leads the supply chain and lowest when the retailer leads the supply chain.(3)The altruistic preference's influence on retail price is different in three game structures.The retail price is the lowest in the Nash game,and it is lower when the member with higher level of altruistic preference becomes the leader in the two other game structures.(4)The altruistic preference's influence on supply chain efficiency is different in three game structures.The supply chain efficiency is the highest in the Nash game,and it is higher when the member with higher level of altruistic preference becomes the leader in the two other game structures.(5)Supplier profit,retailer profit,and total supply chain profit in three game structures are related to altruistic preference.The profit of the supply chain member can be maximized when they themselves become the leader,and the total supply chain profit is the largest in the Nash game.