The Study Of Selection Mechanism Of The State-Owned Enterprise Managers Based On Two-Sided Matching Theory

At present,the selection and appointment of state-owned enterprise managers is mainly based on the administrative appointment system.The state-owned enterprise managers selected by the administrative appointment system have obvious disadvantages in the aspects of knowledge structure,operation mechanism and constraint mechanism,resulting in the low economic efficiency of state-owned enterprises and the loss of state-owned assets.Administrative appointment system is not only not conducive to play the basic role of the market in the allocation of resources,but also not conducive to the establishment of an excellent team of entrepreneurs.Following the hot spots of the reform of state-owned enterprises and on the basis of the completion of the reform of the company system of state-owned enterprises,this paper studies the key point of how to recruit state-owned enterprise managers in a marketoriented way.This paper discusses the selection and employment of state-owned enterprise managers from the perspectives of the theory of stable matching and the practical design of market mechanism.This paper chooses the bilateral matching theory as the tool to study the marketoriented selection and employment of managers in state-owned enterprises,analyzes the disadvantages of the existing selection and employment mechanism of managers in state-owned enterprises,and then combines with the fact that state-owned enterprises have basically completed the corporate system reform,proposes to construct a mechanism for selecting and employment of managers in the centralized market based on the bilateral matching theory.Hiring managers is a more centralized market to match a bilateral market,this article defines the eight major assumptions of the model,on the basis of deferred acceptance algorithm,so as to the operators of state-owned enterprises modern enterprise system requirements for the guidelines,by the board of directors to choose candidate with operation and management ability,describes the centralized market matching algorithm.According to the research of bilateral matching theory on market,the stability of algorithm is the basis of whether a market can exist for a long time.Therefore,the stability of the algorithm and the nonexistence of policy behavior are proved subsequently.At the same time,Netlogo platform was used to conduct simulation modeling for the algorithm of selecting and hiring operators in the central market,and the mismatching degree was defined as = benchmark preference-actual preference.At the end of each simulation,data such as the overall mean mismatch,the average mismatch of the quartile of each score and the mean of the overall mismatch were recorded.Simulation results show that there is a negative correlation between the number of choices and the degree of mismatch,and the larger the number of choices,the smaller the degree of mismatch.When the number of choices is small and other conditions are the same,the more the number of recruitment opportunities,the higher the overall mismatch.Only in the absence of information,increase the number of enterprise recruitment,can reduce the overall mismatch.As long as the applicant can choose as many enterprises as possible,the degree of mismatch can be significantly reduced.This may be a revelation for state-owned enterprises' market-oriented selection of operators.Enterprises from all over the world have the opportunity to jointly screen talents,and at the same time,candidates can have as many opportunities as possible to choose enterprises.Maybe talents with better integration with enterprise culture and higher matching degree with enterprises can be selected to corresponding positions.