Principles Variance And Behaviors Of Operators In State-owned Enterprises

Studies on reform of the state-owned enterprises (SOEs) are always the focal point that the theory field pays close attention to. In recent years, broad and thorough studies on the state-owned enterprises have been carried out by the academe from competition, property right and governance. In which, it is mainly spreaded out surrouding the problem of operater incentive. When reformation practice course of the state-owned enterprises is reviewed, it also can be find what has been changed was always incentive mechanism, during every stage. But nearly nothing has happened on the selection mechanism in several tens years.Laying particular stress on incentive mechanism but ignoring to improve the selection mechanism, which will must brings about a lot of problems. To a certainty, Interactive between these two mechanisms is existe. Whether the original intention of the incentive mechanism that it has been designed to can be realized, if there is no cooperation with selection mechanism? Analysis and discussion of this thesis is just expanding with this problem.Recuring to the research results of succession theory and principal-agent theory, and starting with the available selection mechanism, incentive and restraint mechanism in SOEs, this paper summarize these mechanisms'characters by a mass of demonstration data. Based on which, two stages dynamic game model of incomplit information between SOEs'operaters and their compititors is been constructed. Our studies focus on problems as below.First, whether equilibriums are existed in fixed-wage system, salary and bonus system and annual salary system having been analysed respectively in ideal condition and realistic ones, when operator's effort is weak correlative to the real profit of companies. Game results show that the ideal equilibrium, which two kinds of enterprises will both report their profit according to the facts, exist in all these six conditions. Comparatively, salary and bonus system is the best incentive model in ideal condition. But, when it is real condition in which incentive mechanism is distorted, annual salary system is the best one. We also find that, in real condition, pooling equilibrium operators reporting low profit and separating equilibrium both of them giving false information on profit are easier to appear in salary and bonus mechanism, but annual salary system is more convenient to the appearance of pooling equilibrium operators reporting high profit and separating equilibrium they speak ture words.Second, when there is close relation between operator's effort and enterprise's real output, all above models have been discussed again. Research finds whether it is in ideal condition or real condition, if we want these two kinds of operaters both working hard and reporting profit according to fact, only annual salary mechanism can make it to be true. To combine analysis result foregoing, we can make an important conclusion, that annual salary system replace fix-wage system is is a real kind of system progress in reality. But it also shows that enterprises, real profit can be affected by operator's effort, has unable to realize ideal equilibrium for a long time, which is a state of system defect.Third, we notice two kinds of situations exist in our analysis.One is that probability on-position operators laze on purpose in order to drive down company's real output will appear, when operator's effort can affect the actual profit of enterprise. Usually, it is happened with so strict exterior supervise that operators dare not to make false accounting. The other is that, when competitor's prior probability that think company is belong to high payoff capacity is lower, operators on-position will more likely to report false profit, in order to stick up for their status. The former bring to light recessive loss of national assets that neglected by us all along, and the latter can help us to understand the reason why the social consensus that"low benefit generally exists in SOE"occured.Finally, we proof our theory results by use of examples happened in reality, and bring forward some policy advice to the direction of SOEs reform for the future, from the point of selection mechanism, incentive mechanism supervise mechanism and Public opinion.