Research On The Coupling Of Credit Cooperation And Industrial Cooperation Of Farmers' Cooperative Based On Reputation Effect: Mechanism And Simulation

Rural cooperative finance,as a substitute for formal finance,has always been favored by small farmers.A variety of rural cooperative financial models also sprout in the countryside,but in practice,it can also be found that without formal supervision,some rural credit cooperation organizations which are not suitable for China's rural areas are also problematic.Especially in the mode of pure credit cooperation,due to the lack of substantial constraints on organizations and members,it is very difficult to achieve cooperative relations;In contrast,the co-operative credit cooperation is more stable under the promotion and restriction of industrial development.Based on the cooperative finance theory,reputation effect theory,evolutionary game theory and so on,this paper makes use of the evolutionary game analysis paradigm to cooperate with each other in rural capital(pure credit cooperation)and cooperative industry.Based on the game analysis of the local human behavior under the credit cooperation coupling model,the replicator dynamic equation is constructed,and the evolution and stability strategy of the two models is analyzed by using the decision rules of Jacobian matrix.On this basis,the fourth-fifth-order Runge-Kutta algorithm is used to solve the replicator's dynamic equation on the MATLAB simulation platform.The analysis results show that reputation capital is an important variable that affects the choice of members' policies.In reality,because of this variable,it is impossible to have.It is estimated that the behavior of members deviates from the theory,and the internal credit cooperation of cooperatives can use the income of industrial cooperation as collateral to restrain the moral hazard instead of reputation capital.The simulation results show that loan size,loan interest rate,industrial cooperation income and excess return on default all affect the members' strategic choice.Loan size,loan interest rate more than a certain size will lead to an increase in the likelihood of risk events;The income obtained by the members in the industrial cooperation plays a restrictive role in the moral hazard of the cooperative credit cooperation.The greater the income,the less likely it is for the members to choose the strategy of breach of contract,and at the same time,the short-term excess return of the breach of contract will be achieved.It hinders the moral hazard of industrial cooperation to restrict credit cooperation.On the basis of theoretical analysis and numerical simulation research,In this paper,we use three cases of FM Rural Fund Mutual Aid Society,QS Grain Cooperatives and ZX Jujube Cooperatives to describe the practice of internal credit cooperation in cooperatives,and make a comparative analysis of the cases of different models.The results of case analysis show that the ZX jujube farmer cooperative has consolidated its internal information advantage in practice,taking industrial income ascompensation guarantee,supplemented by other risk control measures,so far no non-performing loans have taken place,and co-operatives have been driven by the non-performing loans.The increase of members' income has important reference significance for other cooperatives to carry out credit cooperation.Based on the above analysis,this paper puts forward four suggestions: one is to select the real industrial cooperation cooperative to carry out the internal credit cooperation pilot;the other is to strengthen the guidance of the cooperative credit cooperation,and to give the cooperative credit cooperation legal status;Third,strengthen the cooperative punishment mechanism construction;The fourth is to scientifically formulate the loan scale and loan interest rate standard,reasonable distribution of benefits.