| This thesis examines the causes of the 1994--1996 Chechen War by analyzing the policies of the Russian and Chechen governments between 1991 and 1994. The development of Chechen separatism in the late 1980s and the creation of a secessionist Chechen government in 1990--1991 are extensively examined. Through the use of Russian and Chechen government documents as well as contemporary reports in the Russian press, I present in detail the negotiation process between Moscow and Grozny in 1992--1994 and I examine why these negotiations failed to reach a peaceful settlement. Ultimately, I argue that the 1994--1996 Chechen War resulted from Moscow's failure adequately to comprehend the history of Russo-Chechen relations, the chaotic conditions in Russia due to the collapse of the Soviet Union, Moscow's failure to develop a coherent strategy for dealing with Chechnya, and the erratic, authoritarian leadership styles of Russian President Boris Yeltsin and Chechen President Dzhokhar Dudaev. |
