Study On The Impact Of Insurance Choice Of Flexible Employees On The Sustainability Of Endowment Insurance

In recent years,China’s aging population has increased sharply,and the problem of population aging has become increasingly serious.Some provinces have faced the dilemma that the basic pension income can not cover the expenditure because of the slowdown of economic growth.To ensure the stable operation of the basic old-age insurance system,an important foundation is that the insured and relevant units can pay in full and on a regular basis as required.Once a large number of insured persons refuse to make regular payments,it will not only cause serious damage to their own pension insurance rights and interests,but also restrict and restrict the expansion of pension insurance coverage,and it is difficult to provide sufficient financial support for the implementation of the pension insurance system,resulting in the actual system operation results difficult to achieve the expectations.According to relevant data from the National Bureau of statistics,by the end of 2021,the number of flexible employees in China had reached 200 million.At this time,the problems such as the weak payment ability of flexible employees,declining income and outstanding demand for pension security have become increasingly reflected.As "rational economic people",they used to consider many factors and choose the insurance mode according to their actual situation to maximize their own interests.According to the survey and statistics,fewer flexible employees are willing to participate in the endowment insurance.At the same time,even if they are willing to participate in the insurance,they usually choose the minimum number of years and the lowest level of payment.The proportion of the insured population whose contribution base exceeds100% of the social average wage is only 12%.The vast majority of the insured still prefer to pay according to the minimum payment years,while 22% of the insured choose to stop paying when the payment years reach 15 years.These phenomena reflect the obstacles and policy guidance in the current urban workers’ endowment insurance system,and have affected the enthusiasm and choice of flexible employees.Flexible employees’ satisfaction and recognition of the current pension insurance system is low,which will cause the imbalance between the income and expenditure of the pension insurance fund to become more and more serious,and affect the sustainability of the basic pension insurance for urban employees.Therefore,it is necessary to study the insurance participation behavior of flexible employees,find out the countermeasures to effectively encourage the group to actively pay,and promote the sustainable development of the old-age insurance system,so as to realize the healthy development of the old-age insurance system for urban employees.In this paper,the modes of flexible employment personnel participating in the old-age insurance for urban employees are specifically divided into "long-term payment for more" and "long-term payment for more".Firstly,the operation status of the "long-term payment for more" and "long-term payment for more" insurance modes is analyzed,the sustainable effect model of old-age insurance is constructed,and the impact of "long-term payment for more" and "long-term payment for more" on the sustainability of old-age insurance is calculated respectively;Secondly,it specifically analyzes the incentive of "long-term payment for more" and "more payment for more" to the insured under the same budget,deeply analyzes the problems existing in the payment incentive mechanism of urban workers’ endowment insurance,carries out the optimization design of the insurance incentive guidance,makes the effect test according to the adjustment,and draws the corresponding conclusion: in the two insurance modes,"more payment for more" is more conducive to the sustainable development of endowment insurance,However,as a "rational economic man",the insured prefer the mode of "long-term payment for more",the current policy has insufficient incentive for "more payment for more",and there are some problems,such as imperfect pension linkage adjustment method,poor incentive effect and so on;Finally,through the combination of theory and practice,this paper puts forward some suggestions to promote the sustainable development of pension insurance,such as establishing a scientific pension treatment adjustment mechanism,improving the transfer and continuation methods of pension insurance,strengthening supervision and control,and improving legislation.