Research On The Impact Of Subsidies For New Energy Vehicles And Dual-credit Policies On Production Decisions Of Automakers And Social Welfare

New energy vehicle industry is an important strategic emerging industry in China,which plays an important role in promoting green development and transformation and upgrading of automobile industry.In promoting the development of China’s new energy vehicle industry,subsidies and dual-credit policy are two important industrial policies introduced in phases.In terms of subsidy policy,the Chinese government started to implement consumer subsidies to promote the adoption of new energy vehicles in 2009,and dynamically adjusted them with the development of the industry.In terms of the dual-credit policy,in line with the subsidies’ withdrawal and in order to strengthen the market-driven mechanism of industrial development,China has implemented the dual-credit policy since 2018 to further promote the development of the new energy vehicle industry by building a credit trading market between fuel vehicle manufacturers and new energy vehicle manufacturers.Although they are both industrial policies,the subsidy and dual-credit policies are characterized by government-driven and market-driven respectively,which will have different impacts on production decisions of automakers and social welfare.The policy effects need to be explored in depth from a theoretical perspective.Based on this,the thesis takes consumer subsidies and relative credit coefficient as policy variables,takes the maximization of social welfare as policy objective,incorporates the negative environmental impact of fuel vehicles into the social welfare function,considers the competition or cooperation between two types of manufacturers(fuel vehicle manufacturers and new energy vehicle manufacturers)in two markets(vehicle market and credit trading market),and constructs the dynamic game model including the government,two types of manufacturers and consumers under two situations of stable and fluctuating credit prices.The theoretical study of the influence mechanism and combined effects of government subsidies and dual-credit policy are conducted.The thesis finds that in the case of stable credit prices:(1)the superimposed dual credit policy makes the output and profit of fuel vehicle manufacturer smaller and the output and profit of new energy vehicle manufacturer larger.However,the price changes of the two types of vehicles are related to their consumption substitution rate and relative point coefficient.(2)The impact of subsidies and relative credit coefficient on social welfare is related to the environmental impact coefficient of fuel vehicles.When the environmental impact coefficient of fuel vehicles is higher than a certain threshold,there is an optimal subsidy to maximize social welfare;when the environmental impact coefficient of fuel vehicles is lower than a certain threshold,social welfare decreases with the increase of government subsidy.When both subsidies and dual-credit policy are considered,the relationship between the relative credit coefficient and social welfare is as follows: when the environmental impact coefficient of fuel vehicles is above a certain threshold,social welfare increases with the increase of the relative credit coefficient;when the environmental impact coefficient of fuel vehicles is below a certain threshold,social welfare decreases and then increases with the relative credit coefficient.Considering two cooperation strategies(credit trading cooperation and joint production)adopted by both types of manufacturers to cope with points market risk in the case of excessive points price volatility,the thesis finds that:(1)The effects of government subsidies and relative credit coefficient on the manufacturers’ output and profit and social welfare are in the same way as the situation with a stable credit price.(2)The increase of government subsidies and relative credit coefficient increases the output of new energy vehicles and total profits of two manufacturers,and decreases the output of fuel vehicles more under the joint production strategy compared to the credit trading cooperation strategy.Besides,the total profit of manufacturers is always higher under the joint production strategy than under the credit trading cooperation strategy,so the closer joint production cooperation is more beneficial to increase the total profit of manufacturers.(3)With the change of relative government subsidies,social welfare is higher under the joint production strategy than under the credit trading cooperation strategy,showing that the former strategy is better for enhancing social welfare.In terms of the relative credit coefficient,when it is small,the social welfare under the joint production strategy is smaller than that under the credit trading cooperation strategy;while when it is larger,the social welfare under the joint production strategy is larger,showing that the joint production strategy is better for enhancing social welfare when the relative credit coefficient is larger.