Research On Incentive Mechanism Of Reverse Supply Chain For Waste Power Battery From The Perspective Of Government Intervention

With the rapid development of new energy vehicles in the Chinese market,the installed volume of power batteries is constantly increasing.At the same time,the first wave of "retirement" of new energy vehicles has also followed,and the problem of recycling power batteries is becoming increasingly serious.There are problems in the recycling of power batteries,such as low participation of manufacturing entities and large-scale occupation of the recycling market by informal enterprises.The solution to this problem requires both close cooperation among member enterprises of the reverse supply chain and active government intervention.Based on this,this thesis conducts research on the operation of enterprises,government intervention,and contract incentives in the reverse supply chain of waste power batteries in China,with the aim of further promoting the recycling and reuse of waste power batteries.Firstly,the optimal decisions of power battery manufacturing enterprises and automobile production enterprises were solved without government intervention,and the recycling cost sharing contract and recycling price subsidy contract were designed to motivate the supply chain to operate better.The analysis shows that in order for the contract to be accepted by the main enterprises in the supply chain,the proportion of shared recovery costs and the amount of subsidy for recovery prices must be within a certain range,and the amount of profits earned by both parties under the contract depends on their position in the supply chain.In addition,the increase in consumer willingness to pay is beneficial for enhancing the position of automobile production enterprises in the supply chain,making them hope to continuously reduce the cost sharing ratio or increase the price subsidy amount,which may make the contract difficult to maintain.Then,a study was conducted on the reverse supply chain of power batteries under external government intervention,and it was found that both government subsidy policies and reward and punishment policies can stimulate the operation of the reverse supply chain.Two types of contracts were also designed to further incentivize the reverse supply chain,and it was found that government intervention would not affect the cost sharing ratio,but could increase the amount of price subsidies.In addition,the incentive effect of government intervention policies is influenced by the position of power battery manufacturing enterprises and automobile production enterprises in the supply chain,and reward and punishment policies are more conducive to automobile production enterprises.Finally,conduct research on the reverse supply chain of power batteries generated by government intervention,and solve and analyze the policy design issues involved.Analysis shows that the government should focus subsidies on waste power batteries that can bring significant environmental benefits,but it is also necessary to comprehensively formulate reverse supply chain decisions based on market risk factors.In addition,the subsidy policy of the government should be inclined to automobile manufacturers with high recovery capacity and low recovery cost,and it can play a more incentive role for automobile manufacturers when the market risk factor is low.This thesis constructs a reverse supply chain model of power batteries with government policies from scratch to endogenous,and analyzes the optimal incentive mechanism design problem in different situations.In future related research,factors such as information asymmetry,consumer supply behavior,and competitive recycling can be further considered in the model.