Evolutionary Analysis Of PPP+TOD Comprehensive Development Cooperation Behavior Based On Value-Added Income Distribution

With the deepening of the new urbanization process,the contradiction between the supply of regional land resources and the demand for urban development has become increasingly acute,forcing the transformation of urban development models.The PPP+TOD(Public-Private-Partnership & Transit Oriented Development)comprehensive development model is an effective way to enhance the spatial value of land and create rail hematopoietic capacity,which can fundamentally solve the problems of rail dependence on financial subsidies and insufficient urban land use efficiency.However,at present,issues such as the absence of top-level systems,lack of industry standards,and unclear development and construction models and processes in the PPP+TOD model are still prominent,restricting the development of the PPP+TOD model.Managing PPP+TOD projects with the concept of cooperation for development is an effective way to promote their efficiency under current limited conditions.In order to explore the emergence mechanism of multi-agent cooperation in the comprehensive development of PPP+TOD,analyze the main contradictions between main stakeholders and conflicts in the distribution of land value-added benefits,and build an evolutionary game model based on public goods game theory to analyze the cooperative evolution mechanism between stakeholders,and propose countermeasures and suggestions to promote the high-quality development of PPP+TOD mode.Firstly,by reviewing the literature and analyzing the current development status and typical problems of the PPP+TOD model,it is found that the current development of urban rail transit is in an upward trend,but most regional rail transit projects generally have characteristics such as insufficient non ticketing revenue and strong dependence on financial subsidies,resulting in low investment efficiency of urban rail transit projects.In addition,the comprehensive development effect of TOD is not good.On the one hand,there is a downward impact on the real estate market.On the other hand,urban rail transit projects and TOD projects are still separated from each other,unable to achieve good economies of scale.Therefore,based on this,analyze the contradictions among the main stakeholders of the PPP+TOD model,focusing on the conflict of land appreciation benefit allocation in PPP+TOD projects,and illustrate the positive impact of resolving conflicts and cooperating on the project by combining the cases of Chongqing Bitong Line and Shapingba Railway Station projects.Secondly,based on the characteristics of participants in the PPP+TOD model and classic public goods game theory,an evolutionary game model for the PPP+TOD comprehensive development cooperation behavior network is constructed,and the income distribution coefficient in the model is improved.Through numerical simulation experiments,the impact of participant size,benefit distribution structure,investment return rate,risk of stakeholders,and investment size on the emergence of cooperative behavior is studied.Finally,based on the experimental conclusions and the practical problems existing in the PPP+TOD model,starting from three dimensions: improving the return on investment,optimizing the benefit distribution structure,and improving the size of participants,it is proposed to improve the project’s return on investment by improving the urban planning and operation capabilities of local government investment and financing platforms,and establishing a sound PPP+TOD land related policy and regulatory system;Ensure the fairness and rationality of the distribution of interests among all parties by formulating PPP+TOD construction process standards and reasonable income distribution structure;Expand the scale of project participants by optimizing the business environment and creating diverse formats.The research conclusions are as follows:(1)The scale of participants in PPP+TOD comprehensive development has a positive impact on the overall project income,but its impact on the level of project cooperation is not monotonic.(2)The return on investment has a positive impact on the level of project cooperation;When the risk is within the acceptable range,the increased risk of the stakeholders will promote the improvement of the level of cooperation.When the risk is beyond the acceptable range,the continued increase in risk will inhibit the emergence of cooperative behaviors.(3)Under different rates of return on investment,the different emphasis of the benefit distribution structure will affect the returns of interest entities at various levels.A distribution structure that highlights the status of interest subjects and the proportion of investment can ensure that different levels of interest subjects distribute income,and can ensure the fairness and rationality of distribution.