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Behavior,Preference Expression And Adjustment Matching Mechanism Of Public Rental Housing Reallocation Problem

Posted on:2021-12-28Degree:MasterType:Thesis
Country:ChinaCandidate:Y N WangFull Text:PDF
GTID:2569306041991509Subject:Industrial Economics
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Public rental housing,as an important part of the urban housing system,plays a special role in the construction of a long-term mechanism for real estate.With the continuous expansion and improvement of its coverage and quality,it not only needs to solve the first demand of applicants who do not rent public rental housing,but also to meet the improving needs of current renters due to various reasons,in order to make the public rental housing and different groups of users match better,which is increasingly worthy of paying attention to.Therefore,based on the SD(serial dictatorship)mechanism that has been used in the initial allocation of public rental housing in China,through controlled laboratory experiments,this paper,in reference to the practical experience in China and the domestic and foreign study,compares the features and performances in the operating efficiency and social welfare between two different preference expressions’RSD(random serial dictatorship with squatting rights)mechanism,that is sequential RSD mechanism and centralized RSD mechanism.What’s more,this paper analyzes participant behavior and explains experiment results from the perspective of cognitive ability,risk attitudes,learning effects,and initial endowments.The research results show:the social welfare level of the sequential RSD mechanism is significantly higher,and the situation of subjects’ distorted preference expression is significantly less.When a certain allocation scale is large,the centralized RSD mechanism has advantages in terms of feasibility and operational efficiency.At the same time,learning can make the operation efficiency of the two mechanisms better;the key factor affecting the participation in adjusting is the initial endowment.Whether the participants can express their preferences faithfully depends on the way the preferences are expressed.At the same time,the participants ’cognitive ability also played an important role in this behavior;the participants’ risk attitude did not have a significant impact on their behavior.According to the research results,this paper suggests that if the applicants of public rental housing can be trained to express their preferences truthfully before the reallocation,the centralized RSD mechanism’s social welfare level will be as good as the sequential RSD mechanism at least and saves more time cost,otherwise it is advisable to weigh the pros and cons according to different conditions to determine the specific matching method.
Keywords/Search Tags:Public rental housing, random serial dictatorship with squatting rights, sequential, centralized, cognitive ability
PDF Full Text Request
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