Research On The Mechanism And Path To Enhanc The Willingness Of Family Farms To Grow Grain Under The Perspective Of Food Security

China’s food security is facing dual pressure from the turbulent international food trading environment and the reduction of domestic agricultural production factors.The turbulence of the international environment,which brought great uncertainty to the global food trade and a potential threat to the import security of China’s wheat,soybeans and other food crops.With the advancement of urbanization,rural labor force continued to shift to cities,and the phenomenon of land abandonment became prominent.The state encourages new business entities represented by family farms to plant grain crops to solve the problem of "who will plant the land" and ensure food security.However,in this process,family farms have a prominent tendency to "abandon grain from the economy",and it is necessary to regulate the "non-grain" behavior of family farms,so that family farms with "non grain" behavior can switch to grain crops.The key is to enhance the willingness of family farms to plant grain.Therefore,exploring the influencing factors of family farm willingness to grow grain,analyzing the mechanism and path of increasing willingness to grow grain,has important practical significance for ensuring China’s food security.Based on the distributed cognition theory,this paper combines the distributed cognition theory with the asset specificity theory,introduces the concept of asset power into the concentric circle model of distributed cognition,constructs an extended distributed cognition concentric circle model to theoretically analyze the grain growing willingness of family farms,and puts forward research hypotheses.Taking Xuzhou and surrounding areas in Jiangsu Province as an example,a survey was conducted on the willingness of family farms to grow grain.162 valid survey questionnaires were obtained,and descriptive statistics were conducted on the survey results.The structural equation model was used to test the reliability and validity of the measurement tools,as well as the fit of the model,to verify the theoretical model constructed.Based on the empirical results of the theoretical model of family farm willingness to grow grain,a tripartite evolutionary game model is constructed for high-level government,grassroots government,and family farm,solving the equilibrium point and its equilibrium conditions,and exploring the mechanism for increasing family farm willingness to grow grain.Based on the distributed cognition theory’s theoretical analysis of family farm’s grain growing willingness and the tripartite evolutionary game analysis of highlevel government,grass-roots government and family farm,two paths to improve family farm’s grain growing willingness are constructed.The main conclusions of this article are as follows:(1)In the survey sample,only5.55% of family farms clearly expressed their willingness to grow grain,while about12.35% were willing to gradually switch to grain crops.The essence of family farms’ lower willingness to grow grain is that they are more profit oriented compared to small farmers.(2)The empirical results indicate that the resource constraints represented by regional power,social environment,and local culture represented by cultural power have a significant positive impact on the willingness of family farms to grow food;The individual characteristics such as personal experience and experience represented by personal strength,as well as the level of asset specificity represented by asset strength,have a significant negative impact on the willingness of family farms to grow food.The improvement of the willingness to grow grain on family farms requires a greater combination of regional and cultural forces than the combination of personal and asset forces.As an internal factor,personal force is difficult to change,and external regional and cultural forces can be changed to optimize the grain growing environment,thereby enhancing the willingness to grow grain.(3)In the context of family farm grain cultivation,the government’s emphasis on food security,that is,whether to adopt regulatory measures for "non grain" behavior,is a manifestation of regional strength.The construction of a cultural atmosphere for grain cultivation also requires government propaganda and mobilization,and the government plays an important role in the mechanism of increasing the willingness of family farm grain cultivation.High level governments should shoulder regulatory responsibilities and urge grassroots governments to implement policies aimed at ensuring food security.Grassroots governments should strictly implement the requirements of high-level governments to regulate "non grain" behavior,and take practical and feasible regulatory measures for family farms with "non-grain" behavior.(4)This paper designs two paths to improve the planting willingness: path one,relying on the government’s mandatory orders and taking rigid regulatory measures to make the regional force greater than the combined force of personal force and asset force.The government regulatory measures in this path have achieved significant results,but a short-term effect is easy to cause negative externality.Path 2: Based on the government’s rigid regulatory measures,flexible regulatory measures such as increasing grain yields,reducing grain costs,and promoting mobilization are used to make the combined force of regional and cultural forces greater than the combined force of personal and asset forces.This path requires a large investment and is a long-term and sustainable path to enhance the willingness of family farms to grow grain.The government should pay more attention to creating a good grain environment for family farms.