Research On The Competition And Cooperation Relationship Between Inland Ports Based On Evolutionary Game Theory

In the context of accelerating the construction of China-Europe freight trains,new land-sea routes and other major international logistics and trade routes.As an important bridge inland port has developed vigorously,connecting inland central cities and coastal ports.To fully utilize its advantages as a logistics hub connecting the East and West,both by land and sea,and the interior and exterior regions,the density of distribution has significantly increased in a short period of time.Currently,there are plans to build over 180 logistics hubs across the country.Xi’an International Trade & Logistics Park is an economic leading zone established to create a new highlight of inland reform and opening up.In light of the development and growth of other dry ports in the vicinity and the issue of redundant construction among inland ports,there exists cut-throat competition for cargo sources.This leads to the squandering of construction resources and the inability to attain projected operating revenue.To optimize resource integration,Xi’an International Trade & Logistics Park and neighboring inland ports ought to enhance collaboration and transform cut-throat competition into a strategic alliance.This will help to maximize benefits.With the government providing reasonable supervision,implementing appropriate incentive and penalty policies,and constructing and developing dry ports,they can play an external role in promoting growth.The main work of this study is as follows:(1)Using the theory of co-opetition as a framework,we conduct an analysis of the competition between Xi’an International Trade &Logistics Park and other inland ports in the vicinity.Additionally,we establish an evaluation index system that takes into account both internal and external factors of the dry port.And utilize the entropy weight method to determine the synergy degrees between these ports.Subsequently,we analyze the results and summarize the advantages,disadvantages,and potential issues related to synergistic development among inland ports.(2)An evolutionary game model is constructed to analyze the factors that contribute to competition between inland ports.The model is based on the assumption of limited rationality and incomplete information.Our aim is to investigate the inner mechanisms and evolution laws that drive decision-making choices for both parties.Furthermore,we aim to determine the evolutionary path and development trends of decision-making for both parties,and then carry out a system simulation analysis.(3)Building upon previous research,we introduce a third-party subject,the government,to explore the internal mechanisms and long-term evolution of strategic choices for the tripartite behavior of the government,Xi’an International Trade & Logistics Park and other inland ports.To construct a tripartite evolutionary game model by examining the strategy choices of each subject in the game system,as well as the game equilibrium problem.And then solve for the evolutionary equilibrium strategy.Conduct a numerical simulation analysis of the evolutionary game model using MATLAB software.Subsequently,analyze the evolutionary trends of each subject as they are influenced by the strategic choices of the other two subjects,then provide separate decision optimization recommendations for each subject involved in the game.Finally,derive a development strategy for Xi’an International Trade & Logistics Park.The results show that:(1)To evaluate the co-opetitive relationship between the Xi’an International Trade & Logistics Park and other inland ports,an evaluation index system was developed.Relevant data were collected and analyzed,leading to the conclusion that the Xi’an International Trade & Logistics Park is likely to strengthen its cooperation with the inland ports in Zhengzhou,Chongqing,and Chengdu in the future.(2)The simulation results of the evolutionary game system between the Xi’an International Trade & Logistics Park and other inland ports demonstrate that the strategic choices made by both sides have a mutual influence and constraint on each other.An effective strategic alliance strategy can mitigate the losses caused by competition and promote the stable development of cooperation between the two sides.A three-party evolutionary game model of the government,Xi’an International Trade &Logistics Park and the inland was constructed,and the model was solved and analyzed through simulation.(3)By constructing a tripartite evolutionary game model of the government,Xi’an International Trade & Logistics Park and inland ports,the solution analysis and simulation analysis of the model are carried out.The research shows that the initial intention of the subject has little influence on its final decision,and does not affect the evolution direction of the game subject.Government subsidies affect the evolution rate of inland ports;The distribution of income ratio between Xi’an International Trade & Logistics Park and other inland ports can affect the strategic evolution of both sides.The study indicates that the subject’s initial willingness has a minimal impact on their final decision and does not affect the evolutionary direction of the game subject.The distribution of the benefit ratio between the Xi’an International Trade & Logistics Park and other inland ports can influence the evolution of strategies for both parties.