The American Government And Congo Crisis (1960-1963)

During the period 1960 to 1963, Congo(Leopoldville)Crisis became a focus of the Cold War. The United States dealt with it from the perspective of the global cold war, and its containment policy of Soviet Union's expansion was the preponderant goal of all foreign policy. However, the Western colonial powers treated it as their colonial and regional benefits, and strongly opposed to American exorbitant intervention in Congo and Africa. The new Afro-Asia Powers supported the Congolese nationalism's appeal, and tried to be the third important force. The growing sense of Congolese nationalists didn't care about the Cold War between the two Camps, but about Congolese sovereignty and territorial integrity. It was doomed to irreconciliability for the American government that these above-mentioned contradictions mingled with conflicts. The American policy-makers had to oscillate according to the urgency of the case.The paper is divided three parts. The introduction reviews the present studies and literatures about this topic. The conclusion summarizes the main findings about American Congolese policy. The main body explains the research questions with five chapters.Chapter one examines the background, focuses on the evolution of American policy towards Africa and Belgian Congo during the 1950s. With the expansion of Cold War, American African policy had changed from resources-oriented to ideology-oriented. During the 1950s, American government drew up its self-governed policy with the African decolonization, meanwhile it must consider it's European allies. Therefore, American African policies couldn't break away from the traditional Europe-oriented policy.Chapter two introduces American reactions and countermeasures during the two months after independence of Congo. Taking chance of Congolese chaos, Belgium send force into Congo and supported Katangan secession. The Congolese nationalists headed by Primier Minister Lumumba had a recourse to the Super-powers to maintain Congolese sovereignty. To avoid Soviet "Korean-style" involvement, Eisenhower administration supported United Nations to maintain Congolese order. However, Lumumba tired to end Katangan secession with Soviet assistance, which made American effort in vain. So overthrowing his political power became Eisenhower's next major objective.Chapter three analyses American effort to overthrow Lumumba's regime, even to assassinate him. Eisenhower administration supported the President Kasavubu dismissal of Lumumba, and then staged a coup d'etat. American policy-makers determined to assassinate Lumumba because of his influence, and carried out some plans for that. At the same time, American leaders began to consider a Kasavubu-Mobutu's temporary government. The death of Lumumba to some extent made Eisenhower calm down, but Congo crisis continued.Chapter four elaborates Kennedy's new Congo policy. To some extent, he overcame the predecessor's lash-up policy, and tried to settle Congo trouble with a democracy-style method. He drew up a new Congo policy of a broadly based government. After Adula's government established, Katangan secession continued, and Kennedy's hesitation between force and negotiation delayed the settlement. Hammarskjold's death made the United State take a strong attitude towards Katanga, and forced Tshombe to sign Kitona agreement.Chapter five investigates Kennedy's effort to end Katangan secession. He supported Adoula in arresting Gizenga, and removed the threat from Stanleyville. In 1962 summer, Kenndy drew up "U Thant Plan" which avoided force and sanctions in essence. But Tshombe's defiance made it fail, and then Kennedy increased the military assistance to United Nations. Finally, without the privity of American, OUNC ended Katangan secession easily with force, and made Kennedy's conciliatory policy fail.