Font Size: a A A

The Conflict Among The Interest Groups In Regeneration Of Village-in-city

Posted on:2012-07-22Degree:DoctorType:Dissertation
Country:ChinaCandidate:X WangFull Text:PDF
GTID:1116330332997548Subject:Sociology
Abstract/Summary:PDF Full Text Request
Village-in-City(VIC) is a kind of village which still keeps rural organizational system. But in contemporary China, this kind of village appears in urban area because of rapidly urbanization and industrialization, rural-urban dualistic structure , the contradiction of land ownership between town and country,institutional vacuum, hysteretic legal system and regulations , and defective and careless city management etc. Considering solving deterioration of the urban function, enhancing the value of urban land and improving environmental quality, the local government actively pushes"Village-in-City"renewal forward. Most villagers support the renewal project because they like to have their deteriorated environment improved and get some benefits from it.The legitimacy foundation in present rural society is interest network rather than traditional culture network or organizational network. The new interest groups have gradually been formed along with the traditional groups or communities divided and disintegrated. The VIC regeneration often includes wide group interests, among which the apprehension of collective-owned land and its distribution are the central issues, resulting in many new interest groups and complicated relationships among the villagers. The local government is the main impeller of VIC regeneration and the stakeholders. VIC regeneration needs a large sum of capitals from developers, so developers are also powerful. The conflicts repeatedly broke out in land expropriation and houses demolition in many regions of China, which shows the benefit game among government, developers and villagers was fierce.The unequal standing game among the three sides is the main cause of conflicts. Recently, the experience of VIC regeneration demonstrates that the government obtains the most share of the appreciation of expropriation land, though they proclaim some preferential policies, including cutting down the price of land and reducing related taxes and fees. In sum, by VIC regeneration, local government may improve the environment, the city image, administrative system, obtaining civil support, consolidating the ruling foundation. All of these are helpful for forming benign municipal management and reducing the cost of city administration in the future, which means low-cost input but increasing contribution margin.The developers'benefits also can be guaranteed. They have two strategies: whether to involved or not. Which strategy they adopt bases on whether the profit rate of VIC regeneration is better than other real estate project. If the developers don't participate in the VIC regeneration, neither government nor villages have enough capitals to develop. So government often make a concession, for example, giving developers preferential policy, helping them get requisition of land and demolition, sharing the reasonable cost for municipal infrastructure, even modifying the FAR(floor-area ratio) for the developers'essential benefits. The repeated game between government and the developers finally brings about Nash equilibrium.The villagers are the most disadvantageous group among three interest groups in the course VIC regeneration. The villagers not only lost their familiar homeland and living environment, but also have to adapt to the unfamiliar circumstances. And low compensation for demolition basically can't substitute for the land's long- safeguard and resistance inflation. The villagers have to undertake many risks resulting from asymmetric information, uncontrolled policies and lack of supervision, etc. More worse, the limited compensation may be uncertain, either settlement allowance in arrears or quality problems of resettlement houses. All of these originate from powerful government and capitals. The government is not only the principal interest game player, but also the policy maker. It's hard to prevent it from making high return through policy-seek-rent. A series of institutions related to VIC regeneration, such as requisition of land, demolition and the Law of Land Administration and so on, are advantageous to government but limited to villagers. It's necessary to establish the equal game platform for all interest groups in order to avoid frequent conflicts in the course of VIC regeneration. Firstly, relevant laws, regulations and institutions should be straightened out or revised so as to set up equilibrium institutions for any group. Secondly, villagers'systematic level and negotiable ability should be enhanced so as to act as a counterweight to other groups. Thirdly, various social sectors should play a role in supervising the course of VIC regeneration. Fourthly, it is necessary to accelerate land market reform and break government's monopoly of primary land market, thereby villagers can acquire reasonable and institutional compensation and benefits. But the precondition is to reform government administrative system. The core is to turn"control-oriented"government to"good-governance-oriented"government.
Keywords/Search Tags:Village-In-City(VIC), Conflict, Interest Group, Game, Government, Developer, Land Expropriation and Demolition, Wenzhou
PDF Full Text Request
Related items