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Game Analyses On Some Problems Found In Establishing Enterprise Group Based Upon Cooperative Efficiency

Posted on:2002-12-16Degree:DoctorType:Dissertation
Country:ChinaCandidate:X D LinFull Text:PDF
GTID:1116360062980356Subject:Management Science and Engineering
Abstract/Summary:PDF Full Text Request
Enterprise group is one of the most important organizational forms of economy in modern society. It plays an allocative role in regulating social economic resources, and becomes a major force pushing social economic forward. Theoretical researches on enterprise group problems are concentrated on: (i) the economics causes why enterprise groups are developed; (ii) cooperative economic interpretation about joint bonds within enterprise group; and (iii) studies on efficient decision-authority allocation corresponding with organizational structure within enterprise group.Although existing theoretical literatures have acknowledged the importance of cooperation in developing enterprise group, deeper analyses about cooperation are assumed away. Theoretical discussions remaining on a descriptive level limit the ability for those literatures to solve the problems within enterprise group. Viewing whether cooperative efficiency is improved as a starting point of research, this dissertation is to resolve some difficulties confronted with during the development of enterprise group. Centering on this goal, many meaningful conclusions are achieved.First, the game theory is introduced into the overall process of establishing enterprise group. At the stage of recruiting target firms, a renegotiation game analysis is applied into answering how to select a qualified cooperative member. At the stage of intergration, a negative incentive model is taken advantage of to bind the defaulting behavior of member firms. And at the stage of group's normal operation, a team punishment allocation model based on allocation coefficient is set up, which can solve the "free-riding" problem caused by share contract.Then, in Chapter 3 a theoretical explanation for partial ownership arrangement existing among group members is provided under the background of specific investment between vertical suppliers and buyers. Through installing specific investment degree parameter (denoted by a), relative bargaining capability parameter (denoted by A), outside option value parameter (denoted by nQ ) and average premium (discount) price coefficient (denoted by ft) into the same model framework,some major conclusions are obtained about the relations between the first-best partial ownership and A(TTO or ).A multi-agent model on team production within enterprise group is set up in Chapter 4. According to the model's solutions and its characteristics, the influences of helping effort on designing the optimal incentive contract are emphatically discussed, and a sufficient condition for team work to be optimal is obtained. Besides, the distortion effect of ownership coefficient is pointed out.Recognizing information variable is indispensable in the cooperative process within enterprise group, it is posed that information problems should be associated with the origins of establishing enterprise group. From the view-angle of information state affecting cooperative trade efficiency, discussions are penetrated through information-sharing mechanism and efficient decision authority allocation problems within enterprise group.Finally, based on the studies on resource allocation efficiency of internal capital market, a two-tiered agency model is set up, how rent-seeking behaviors of member firms' managers affect investment allocation decision made by headquarters manager is demonstrated. From equilibrium solutions of the model, it's inferred that the larger the divergence of member firm's productivity is, the higher probability of investment allocation distortion it is.
Keywords/Search Tags:enterprise group, cooperative efficiency, game theory, the optimal incentive scheme, information alliance, agency model
PDF Full Text Request
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