A Game Theoretical Approach To The Strategic Alliance

The strategic alliance has been one of the important branches of the industrial organization and management practice in recent times, and the game theory is one of the hotspots of contemporary economics and management science. Aiming to banding the two together, this thesis puts forward a new field of the strategic alliance via game theoretical approach for the first time. It is of theoretical and practical significance both for profound understanding of the strategic alliance and practical application of the game theory. The choice selection and payoff change among the interacted members of strategic alliance are studied systematically with the game theoretical method. The main research contents are as follows:1. After surveying the current results of the strategic alliance, this thesis puts forward a new aspect of the game theoretical study on the strategic alliance, introduces the essentials and the description method, discusses the rationality basis, the fairness and efficiency concerning the revenue allocation.2. With the analysis of game theoretical models of output, price and the market entry, the possibility and necessity of forming strategic alliance are analyzed, and demonstrated in general by the folk theorem. The two principles of the greatest good and risk dominant equilibrium are proposed, and the paths to strategic alliance are illustrated with case study also. The probationary period for those who would-be new recruit is analyzed by the signal model of the repeated game, finally, the paper argues that the strategic alliance doesn't mean cartel.3. On the basis of the Nash solution to two players bargaining, this paper works the alliance solution out by introducing the strategic alliance line, the consistency of Nash and Rubinstein solution on the condition of discount coefficient 1 is indicated. Then the thesis describes the three main bargaining difficulties of the n-players1 revenue allocation, and thinks a general method of sub-coalition analysis out to illustrate the three players bargaining, the alliance solution formula is drew from those in which there is no sub-coalition. Three kinds of the disagreement point confirmation are pointed out. After reviewing the meaning of the utility function, the thesis explores the relationship between the enterprises' risk attitude and the expected revenue originally with the conclusion that they are positive co-related. A special kind of minimal winning coalition isinvestigated with the examples, two kinds of design mechanisms, namely, (0,1) coalition and equilibrium coalition, which ensure the solution existence of the revenue allocation, are given out.4. This thesis reviews the significance of the stability of strategic alliance, analyzes the alliance threaten with complete and incomplete information by setting up a model. The lifecycle of strategic alliance is introduced and probed into by the output model in which some members are irrational in decision making. The stability is analyzed from three aspects, say, the agreement content, expected revenue and the information structure, and several disintegration factors are described also.5. After pointing out the enlightenment of the strategic alliance for the Chinese cooperation, this thesis analyzes the strategic alliance institution innovation by a formalized model of some railway engineering construction cooperation, two paths of warrant and self-determination are deduced afterwards. Based on the actual relationship between the banks and the enterprises, the paper proposes a tentative plan of constructing a cross share-hold strategic alliance, the merits, the possible moral and running hazards are speculated also.6. Finally, the contents of the paper are concluded, the innovative results and the shortage are pointed out.