Polarization Of Smallholders, Difference Of Agricultre Resourse Allocation Among Smallholders And Policy Meaning

Food security is an important issue in China. During the periods of many kinds of regulations on food production since the economic reform, although the autonomy of plant decisions has not been granted to smallholders, macro food security is realized successfully. In the past few years, market-oriental reform of food production is more and more manifest, and many regulations on food porduction have been canceled. The path towards national food security is changing remarkably. A perfect path is following thoery of comparative advantage, to achieve the aim of food security under the market price mechanism and indirect subsidy policy. However, there are many factors affecting this perfect path. In fact, the goals of small farmers are not always inosculating with the national goal on food security.This paper focuses on the mechanism of agriculture resource allocation of smallholders, possible departure and related causes between small farmers and national aims and policy meanings. Conclusions are drawn as follows:First, this paper focuses on the inner causes, extrinsic exhibition and differences of mechnism of agriculture resource allocation of samll farmers according to the fluidity character of agriculture resource. On the basis of specs analysis, smallholders are diviede into three types: self-cultivate smallholders, hired-cultivate smallholders and quitted-cultivate smallholders. Thereinto, self-cultivate smallholders are divided into two kinds of sub-type, one is I self-cultivated smallholders and the other is II self-cultivated smallholders.Second, the causes of smallholders' polarization are analyzed theoretically and empirically under the households' production-consumption model. The results indicate that: firstly, considering the differences of opportunity cost: I self-cultivate smallholders prefer a labor-intensive cultivation as a result of being short of human capital and thus have no channel to work on the non-agricuture fields. II self-cultivate smallholders come from two different channels, one is the changing of I self-cultivated small farmers who have chance to shift to non-agricuture fields partly, but not entirely. the other channel is small fanners who have steady-going income from others without input. Hired-cultivate smallholders are shaped with the increasing chance of working on the non-agriculture fields. And quit-cultivate smallholders are generated as a result of the entire labor shift to non-agriculture fields and their no food consumption needs from self-lands. Secondly, when taking the income transfer inside the small fanners' family into consideration, we can find that: if the income transferred from the members work on non-agriculture fields, to the agriculture producer, this family will reduce their labor on agriculture production, vice versa. Thirdly, as small farmer's preference of leisure intensifies by ageing, their consumption non-differences curve will be sharp, and so they will decrease the input of labor forces in agricultural production. Above theoretical analysis are proved by two PROBIT models empirically.Third, the paper chooses three villages, cultivating rice manily, as research samples, and focus on: (1)on the background of price of rice, cotton, soybean and production means in the past three years ,we analysize the mechinism ,difference and causes about actions of small farmers on price. Main conclusions are as following: quit-cultivate smallholders adjust their quited lands to someone who are more affinal especailly when price goes up; part of hired-cultivate smallholders consider to change the labor input if price change, unless hired labor does not come from market. And part of hired-cultivate smallholders will not consider changing input if hired labor coming from market as a result of moral hazard of hired labor. I self-cultivate smallholders have potential influence if price changes, but sometimes potential influence is difficult to change into reality. II self-cultivate smallholders have no manifest actions when price changes. (2) On the background of direct subsidy of cultivated-land in 2005, we analyze the mechanism, difference and causes about the actions of smallholders on direct subsidy. Main conclusions are got as follows: some quitted-cultivate smallholders adjust their quited lands to someone others, but no one change the preference of quitting lands; hired-cultivate smallholders increase quitted cultivated lands and subsidy is not used on agriculture production fields except some of them substitute mechine input for labor input. I self-cultivate smallholders also do not increase input to agriculture production fields, and many of them think their agriculture production welfare is going down as an direct role of subsidy. Infulence of subsidy on II self-cultivate smallholders is as same as hired-cultivate smallholders. Forth, the reactions of different smallholders towards the direct subsidy policy in 2004 are analyzed. Commonly, the policy was welcomed by all types of farmers, and except II self-cultivate smallholders and the hire-cultivate ones invested more on agricultural mechanism, all the others make use of the subsidies outside agricultural production or by consumption. The different reaction of smallholders are as follows: (1) for the I self-cultivate smallholders, on one hand, the subsidy are not used as agricultural investment, on the other hand, some one increase their production scale; (2) for the II self-cultivate smallholders, plant scales are not changed; (3) for the hire-cultivate smallholders, someone quits after being subsidized; 4)quit-cultivate smallholders adjust their objects only. In general, the subsidies are not transferred into the investment of rice production. Quit-cultivate increase in short time, and induce to an increasing production in a short time. The failure of the subsidy policy is obvious.Finally, some policy suggestions are drawn from the above conclusions: (1) for short time, government should provide some practical public technology in main grain production area; (2) for long time, the direct subsidy system should be modified to encourage the generate of the large scale farmers.At last, main conclusions of this paper are got as follow:(1) the difference of different small farmers labor chance cost is manifest more and more with the development of society and cancelling of policy which constrain the freedom shift of labor. Difference of small farmer's actions on price signal and difference of input during the agriculture production are as a result of difference of labor chance cost which will influence or block the comparative advantage of special areas changing into economic competence.(2)in a way current policy of subsidy is just an income subsidy policy which will benefit all small farmers, in the short run ,this policy can not lead to small farmers increase input of special grain .in the long run ,that also can not generate the tendency of agriculture production's in the large scale .and not only the aim of production efficiency but also aim of food security will not come true.